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In NLRB v. Hendricks County Rural Electric Membership
Corp.,' the United States Supreme Court held that the "labor
nexus" standard employed by the National Labor Relations Board
(NLRB or Board) in determining whether employees are excluded
from collective bargaining units because they are "confidential"
employees has a reasonable basis in the law. The Court affirmed
the NLRB's long-standing policy of narrowly defining "confiden-
tial" employees as those employees "who assist and act in a confi-
dential capacity to persons who exercise 'managerial' functions in
the field of labor relations."' In the majority's eye, not all employ-
* B.A., 1973, Brandeis University; J.D., 1976, Yale Law School, Yale University. Attor-
ney at Law, Brynelson, Herrick, Gehl & Bucaida, Madison, Wisconsin; member, District of
Columbia Bar and Wisconsin Bar.
** B.A., 1966, Willamette University; J.D., 1971, Hastings College of the Law, Univer-
sity of -California. Associate Professor of Law, Marquette University Law School; member,
California Bar and Wisconsin Bar.
1. 454 U.S. 170 (1981).
2. 454 U.S. at 189 (quoting Ford Motor Co., 66 N.L.R.B. 1317, 1322 (1946)). See also
B.F. Goodrich Co., 115 N.L.R.B. 722 (1956); Minneapolis-Honeywell Regulator Co., 107
N.L.R.B. 1191 (1954); Bond Stores, Inc., 99 N.L.R.B. 1029 (1952).
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ees working in a confidential capacity or possessing access to confi-
dential or other sensitive information pertaining to their employers
must be excluded from coverage under the National Labor Rela-
tions Act (NLRA or Act),3 irrespective of whether such informa-
tion involved labor relations matters.
The Court also determined that the subsequent passage of the
Labor Management Relations Act (LMRA or Taft-Hartley Act)'
did not indicate any desire on the part of Congress to broaden the
scope of the Board's "confidential employee" category.6 It noted
the Taft-Hartley Act's express inclusion within its coverage of
"professional employees,"" a class often privy to confidential infor-
mation.8 The Court found the Board had limited the "confidential
employee" category to those employees who assist and act in a con-
fidential capacity to persons who formulate, determine and effectu-
ate management policies in the field of labor relations or who have
regular access to confidential information concerning anticipated
changes which may result from collective bargaining.9 The Court
concluded the Board's policy was "rooted firmly in the Board's un-
derstanding of the nature of the collective bargaining practice and
Congress' acceptance of that practice." 10
In a separate opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part,
Justice Powell (joined by Chief Justice Burger and Justices Rehn-
quist and O'Connor) agreed that an employee's possession of "pro-
prietary or nonpublic business information" did not, in and of it-
self, mandate his or her exclusion from the protection of the
NLRA as "confidential." 1 However, Justice Powell maintained
that the majority's endorsement of the Board's "labor nexus" test
tended to "obliterate the line between management and labor"
which, he contended, was a sharp division intended by Congress
3. 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-168 (1976 & Supp. V 1981).
4. 454 U.S. at 190-91. The Court reversed the holding of the United States Court of
Appeals for the Seventh Circuit that "all secretaries working in a confidential capacity,
without regard to labor relations, [must] be excluded from the Act." 603 F.2d 25, 30 (7th
Cir. 1979) (emphasis in original), relying upon NLRB v. Bell Aerospace Co., 416 U.S. 267,
283-84 n.12 (1974).
5. 29 U.S.C. §§ 141-187 (1976 & Supp. V 1981).
6. 454 U.S. at 181.
7. 29 U.S.C. § 152(12) (1976).
8. 454 U.S. at 184-85.
9. Id. at 189, citing Pullman Standard Div. of Pullman, Inc., 214 N.L.R.B. 762 (1974);
Triangle Publications, Inc., 118 N.L.R.B. 595 (1957); B.F. Goodrich Co., 115 N.L.R.B. 722
(1956).
10. 454 U.S. at 190.
11. Id. at 192 (Powell, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
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when it passed the Taft-Hartley Act."' He further argued that the
"supervisory," "confidential" and "managerial" exclusions from
the NLRA were specifically designed to maintain this division,13
and that the evolution of these exclusions by the Board and the
courts indicated that "employees who by their duties, knowledge
or sympathy were aligned with management should not be treated
as members of labor."" While not rejecting the "labor nexus" test
for "confidential" employees outright, Justice Powell stated that
the standard was merely one means of identifying those employees
"aligned with management. ' He termed the majority's view of that
standard as overly narrow and "antithetical to any common-sense
view or understanding of the role of confidential secretaries" and,
by clear implication, of other "confidential" employees.1 5 Justice
Powell distilled the essence of the minority's view as follows:
After today's decision, labor must accept into its ranks confidential secre-
taries who are properly allied to management. And these confidential em-
ployees who are privy to the daily affairs of management, who have access
to confidential information, and who are essential to management's opera-
tion may be subjected to conflicts of loyalty when the essence of their work-
ing relationship requires undivided loyalty. The basic philosophy of the la-
bor relations laws, the expressed intent of Congress, and the joint desire of
labor and management for undivided loyalty all counsel against such a
result.' 6
This article considers whether the letter and spirit of the NLRA
exclude from its coverage as "confidential" or "managerial" all em-
ployees who are purportedly closely aligned with management or
12. Id. Justice Powell also contended that the majority opinion was inconsistent with
the Court's decision in NLRB v. Bell Aerospace Co., 416 U.S. 267 (1974), in which the Court
excluded all "managerial" employees from the coverage of the Act regardless of whether or
not they had a "labor nexus." 454 U.S. at 193 (Powell, J., concurring in part and dissenting
in part).
13. 454 U.S. at 193 (Powell, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Justice Pow-
ell cited the following Board decisions excluding employees aligned with management from
collective bargaining units comprised of rank-and-file employees: AFL-CIO, 120 N.L.R.B.
969 (1958) (employees "who formulate, determine, and effectuate an employer's policies");
Denver Dry Goods, 74 N.L.R.B. 1167 (1947) (employees who have "interests ... more
closely identified with those of management"); Burke Brewery, Inc., 54 N.L.R.B. 1061 (1944)
(employees who "are on an intimate relationship with officers of the company"); Freiz &
Sons, 47 N.L.R.B. 43 (1943) (employees "closely related to management").
14. 454 U.S. at 193 (Powell, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Justice Pow-
ell also disagreed with the Board's theory expressed in its decision that "confidential" em-
ployees might be afforded certain rights under the Act even if they were to be excluded from
the right to engage in collective bargaining. Id. at 197-98 (Powell, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part). The majority declined to take a position on this issue. Id. at 185 n.19.
15. Id. at 197 (Powell, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
16. Id. at 199-200 (Powell, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
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who have access to confidential business information, regardless of
any "labor nexus." Part II traces and analyzes the legislative his-
tory and development of the underlying policies sought to be ad-
vanced by these exclusionary categories. Part III summarizes the
development of the "managerial" employee exclusion and the role
of that exclusion in determining the status of the "management-
aligned" employee. Part IV considers the implications of the hold-
ing of Hendricks County and of Justice Powell's separate opinion
in light of the background and purpose of these exclusions from
the NLRA.
It is the authors' conclusion that determining an employee's eli-
gibility for coverage under the Act on the basis of factors other
than objective job content and the authority carried by the job in-
troduces a loyalty standard into the field of labor relations that has
no place under the basic philosophy of the federal labor laws. This
is especially true with respect to a class of employees whose exclu-
sion from collective bargaining is premised upon mere access to
information.
In addition, the exclusion of "management-aligned" yet not au-
thentically "managerial" employees from the coverage of the Act
would undermine the very foundation of those laws. Employees, to
the maximum extent feasible, should be free to choose whether to
engage in self-organization and collective bargaining or whether to
refrain from such activity. The majority in Hendricks County, by
applying a narrow construction to the categorical exclusion of
"confidential employees," adopted the correct approach to the is-
sue of the Act's coverage in view of the goals of the collective bar-
gaining process, and of the purposes sought to be achieved by the
Act.
It is in a sense unfortunate that the majority opinion merely
held that the Board's "labor nexus" test had a "reasonable basis in
law" without a fuller discussion of what that basis is in view of the
policies sought to be achieved by the Act. This article will attempt
to provide a fuller understanding of the rationale supporting the
Board's standard.
II. BACKGROUND OF THE "CONFIDENTIAL" EMPLOYEE EXCLUSION
A. Scope of the Term "Employee" under the Act
The basis for the Act is the fundamental right of employees to
freely form, join or assist labor organizations and to engage in col-
lective bargaining and other so-called "protected concerted" activi-
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ties.17 The balance of the Act generally concerns the definition of
those rights and the mechanism for their enforcement. 8
In drafting the Act, Congress recognized the need to describe the
class of "employees" to be afforded its protections and, conversely,
the need to describe that class which, by virtue of its status with
respect to employers, was to be deemed beyond its reach. From the
outset, Congress adopted the approach of casting the net of the
Act widely, and of excluding only certain narrowly defined persons
from its coverage. In its original form, the Act broadly termed an
"employee" as "any employee," without mention of any exclusions
for "supervisory," "confidential," or "managerial" employees, or
for any employees who might be deemed to fall within a "decision-
making" role.19 Indeed, the only exclusions set forth as categorical
17. Section 7 of the Wagner Act stated in its original form as follows:
Employees shall have the right to self-organization, to form, join or assist in labor
organizations, to bargain collectively through representatives of their own choosing,
and to engage in concerted activities, for the purpose of collective bargaining or other
mutual aid or protection.
Labor Management Relations Act, ch. 372, §7, 49 Stat. 449, 452 (1935).
Section 1 of the Wagner Act, id. at ch. 372, § 1, 49 Stat. at 449-50 (1935), also indicates
tflat the underlying purpose of the Act was to curtail abuses and injury to interstate com-
merce stemming from the denial by employers of the right of employees to freely choose to
engage in organizational activity, bargaining and associated pursuits, and explicitly stated
that the Act was designed to afford employees the opportunity to freely exercise those rights
if they so chose.
18. This fundamental purpose was acknowledged by the Court in its affirmation of the
Act's constitutionality in NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 33-34 (1937):
(I]n its present application, the statute goes no further than to safeguard the right
of employees to self organization and to select representatives of their own choosing
for collective bargaining or other mutual protection without restraint or coercion by
their employer.
That is a fundamental right. Employees have as clear a right to organize and select
their representatives for lawful purposes as the respondent has to organize its busi-
ness and select its own officers and agents. Discrimination and coercion to prevent
the free exercise of the right of employees to self-organization and representation is a
proper subject for condemnation by a competent legislative authority.
[Clollective action would be a mockery if representation were made futile by inter-
ference with freedom of choice. Hence, the prohibition of Congress of interference
with the selection of representatives for the purpose of negotiation and conference
between employers and employees "instead of being an invasion of the constitutional
right of either, was based on the recognition of the rights of both."
Id.
19. Section 2(3) of the Wagner Act, Labor Management Relations Act, ch. 372, §2(3),
49 Stat. 449, 450 (1935), states in relevant part:
The term "employee" shall include any employee and shall not be limited to the
employees of a particular employer, unless the Act explicitly states otherwise, and
shall include any individual whose work has ceased as a consequence of, or in connec-
tion with, any current labor disputes or because of any unfair labor practice, and who
has not obtained any other regular and substantially equivalent employment, but
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exceptions from its coverage concerned two specific occupational
categories-agriculture and domestic-service workers-and persons
having an immediate familial relationship to the employer. Con-
gress placed all other employees, presumably including supervisors
and employees who might be construed to be members of manage-
ment, within the coverage of the Act.
In NLRB v. Hearst Publications, Inc.,2" the Supreme Court con-
sidered the scope of the term "employee" and reasoned that it
could not be read in an overly technical sense, but must be consid-
ered in light of the incidents of the employment relationship and
the basic purposes of the Act.21 The Court further recognized that
the policies underlying federal labor legislation and the remedies
afforded by that legislation were designed to address fundamental
disparities of power and other problems inherent in the employee-
employer relationship. Consequently, the technical labels used to
characterize the relationships in particular cases were rejected as
determinative of the Act's coverage.22
In order to resolve any remaining doubt, the Court declared that
the term "employee," as defined in section 2(3) of the Wagner Act,
shall not include any individual employed as an agricultural laborer, or in the domes-
tic service of any family or person at his home, or any individual employed by his
parent or spouse..
Id.
20. 322 U.S. 111, reh'g denied, 322 U.S. 769 (1944).
21. Id. at 124-25. The Court stated:
Congress was not seeking to solve the nationally harassing problems with which
the statute deals by solutions only partially effective. It rather sought to find a broad
solution, one that would bring industrial peace by substituting, so far as its power
could reach, the rights of workers to self-organization and collective bargaining for
the industrial strife which prevails where these rights are not effectively established.
Yet only partial solutions would be provided if large segments of workers about
whose technical legal position such local differences exist should be wholly excluded
from coverage by reason of such differences. Yet that result could not be avoided, if
choice must be made among them and controlled by them in deciding who are "em-
ployees" within the Act's meaning. Enmeshed in such distinctions, the administration
of the statute soon might become encumbered by the same sort of technical legal
refinement as has characterized the long evolution of the employee-independent con-
tractor dichotomy in the courts for other purposes. The consequences would be ulti-
mately to defeat, in part at least, the achievement of the statute's objectives.
Id. at 125.
22. Id. at 129. The Court also stated:
[Tihe broad language of the Act's definitions, which in terms reject conventional
limitations on such conceptions as "employee," "employer," and "labor dispute,"
leaves no doubt that its applicability is to be determined broadly, in doubtful situa-
tions, by underlying economic facts, rather than technically and exclusively by previ-
ously established legal classifications.
Id. (footnote omitted).
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"must be understood with reference to the purpose of the Act and
the facts involved in the economic relationship. Where all the con-
ditions of the relation require protection, protection ought to be
given.
'23
The Hearst Court referred any fashioning of limitations on the
scope of the term "employee" to the expertise of the Board, given
the Board's familiarity with the nuances of various employment ar-
rangements and of the purposes and operation of the collective
bargaining process.24 Terming this task one of "specific application
of a broad statutory term," the Court held that the Board's deter-
mination as to which persons are, or are not, "employees" must be
upheld on review if it had "warrant in the record" and a "reasona-
ble basis in law."'2 5 This was the precise standard employed by the
Court thirty-seven years later in reviewing the Board's definition
of "confidential" status in Hendricks County.
Two decisions of the United States courts of appeals from this
period illustrate the liberal interpretation generally given to the
term "employee." In Phelps Dodge Corp. v. NLRBJ the Second
Circuit, in ruling that certain strikers retained their employee sta-
tus under the Act, stated that "the definition of employee in the
NLRA is very broad and should not be narrowed to make abortive
the remedial purposes of the statute.'
7
In North Whittier Heights Citrus Ass'n v. NLRB,28 the Ninth
Circuit considered the scope of the "agricultural laborer" exclusion
from the Act's definition of "employee." The court found the
"common denominator" among the three exclusions from the defi-
nition of "employee" was that, "there never would be a great num-
ber suffering under the difficulty of negotiating with the actual em-
ployer and there would be no need for collective bargaining. ' 19
North Whittier suggested two important factors for measuring the
proper coverage of federal labor laws: first, the employee's need for
the rights and protection afforded by those laws, irrespective of the
employee's formal relationship to the employer; and second, the
23. Id. See also NLRB v. Texas Natural Gasoline Corp., 253 F.2d 322 (5th Cir. 1958).
24. Hearst, 322 U.S. at 130-31.
25. Id. See also Packard Motor Car Co. v. NLRB, 330 U.S. 485, 491-92. In Pittsburgh
Plate Glass Co. v. NLRB, 313 U.S. 146 (1941), the Supreme Court noted that the Board had
"broad discretion" to determine appropriate bargaining units under section 9 of the Act.
26. 113 F.2d 202 (2d Cir. 1940), modified on other grounds, 313 U.S. 177 (1941).
27. 113 F.2d at 205.
28. 109 F.2d 76 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 310 U.S. 632, reh'g denied, 311 U.S. 724
(1940).
29. Id. at 80.
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particular purpose to be served by those laws in furthering the
rights of employees to collectively bargain or to refrain from
bargaining.
B. Emergence of the "Confidential" Employee Exclusion
Under the Act
The "confidential" and "managerial" exclusions under the Act
were developed entirely by the Board in its administration of the
Act as these exclusions were not expressly provided for in the Act.
The notion that employees performing "confidential" duties or
having access to confidential business records should be properly
excluded from rank-and-file collective bargaining units dates back
almost to the date of the Board's creation. A number of early
Board cases excluded purportedly "confidential" employees from
bargaining units without further inquiry into the nature and extent
of their "confidential" duties, often by stipulation of the employer
and the union.30 In these early decisions, the distinction between
"confidential" and what subsequently became "managerial" status,
or the bases upon which "confidential" status were premised, was
often quite unclear. However, the distinction evolved once the
30. See, e.g., Bohn Aluminum Brass Corp., 47 N.L.R.B. 1229 (1943) (employment and
personnel department employees excluded from unit due to their access to their employer's
confidential personnel records); Bendix Aviation Corp., 47 N.L.R.B. 43 (1943) (expediters
excluded from unit on ground that they "are closely related to management"); Chrysler
Corp., 36 N.L.R.B. 157 (1941) (confidential secretaries excluded on the basis of lack of com-
munity of interest with bargaining unit composed of clerical employees, "their work being of
confidential nature or consisting of creative rather than clerical work"); E.P. Dutton Co., 33
N.L.R.B. 761 (1941) (excluded all confidential secretaries to executives from bargaining
units on the grounds of their "close connection with management"); Sloss-Sheffield Steel &
Iron Co., 32 N.L.R.B. 710 (1941) (clerical employees at general executive offices excluded as
"confidential" by stipulation); Western Union Tel. Co., 30 N.L.R.B. 679 (1941)(private sec-
retaries to metropolitan traffic manager and to chief clerk/superintendent excluded from
industrial bargaining unit due to performance of "confidential" duties); Menasco Mfg. Co.,
28 N.L.R.B. 1190 (1940) (clerical employees who "sometimes perform confidential or semi-
confidential work excluded from bargaining unit comprised of production and maintenance
employees 'in accordance with usual practice' "); Pacific Am. Fisheries, Inc., 28 N.L.R.B. 244
(1940) ("bookkeeper" who functions as "virtually independent officer manager" excluded as
both "confidential" and "supervisory"); Wilson & Co., 26 N.L.R.B. 1353 (1940) (department
clerks excluded from unit on grounds that they are "part of management" and that they
have access to all of the employer's payroll and other confidential records); Agwilines, Inc.,
12 N.L.R.B. 366 (1939); Southern Pacific Steamship Lines, 8 N.L.R.B. 1263 (1938); S.
Blechman & Sons, Inc., 4 N.L.R.B. 15 (1937) (Board held that it would be "anomalous" to
include "employees whose duties are of a confidential nature" within a bargaining unit when
the union agreed to their exclusion and where such employees were influential in a former
"company union" found to be employer-dominated in violation of section 8(2) of the Wag-
ner Act).
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Board began to give greater consideration to just what sort of
"confidential" duties merited exclusion of an employee from a bar-
gaining unit.
From the start, the Board indicated that the Act's coverage ex-
tended to employees who did not fit within the stereotypical rank-
and-file industrial worker concept and who might even possess cer-
tain links to management. In Chrysler Corp.,31 one of its first deci-
sions, the Board rejected the employer's contention that automo-
tive design engineers should be exempt from the Act's coverage on
the basis of their alleged "personal relationship" to management.32
Following its determination that the degree of skill, training and
expertise inherent in a position did not necessarily impinge upon
the incumbent's status as an "employee" under the Act, the Board
extended that reasoning to embrace employees in possession of
confidential business information. The first indication that "confi-
dential" status was to be strictly limited to employees performing
labor relations and personnel functions or to employees possessing
access to employer information in those particular areas was in the
Board's decision in Brooklyn Daily Eagle.83 There, the Board drew
a sharp distinction between secretaries whose confidential duties
included subjects relating to union-management relations and
those whose duties did not, excluding the secretaries to the manag-
ing editor and editor of the newspaper from the bargaining unit."
In contrast, the Board included within the bargaining unit the sec-
31. 1 N.L.R.B. 164 (1936).
32. Id. at 169-70, stating-
According to the Act, the term "employee" includes "all employees." The nature of
the work done by the engineers is quite clear by the record. It is true that this work
requires a considerable degree of skill and more or less imagination. There is nothing,
however, peculiarly personal in the relationship between the Company and its many
hundred engineers. They are in no sense executives. The engineers have need for or-
ganized strength in common with all wage earners. This is their own opinion as shown
by the impetus to organization provided by a wage cut uniformly suffered. We can
find no reason for differing with them.
Id. See also Willy's Overland Motors, Inc., 9 N.L.R.B. 924 (1938); Allis Chalmers Mfg. Co., 4
N.L.R.B. 159 (1937).
33. 13 N.L.R.B. 974 (1939).
34. Id. at 986. The Board stated that:
Their work is of a confidential nature. We take notice of the fact that in negotiat-
ing and in other dealings concerning grievances, the interests of a union and the
management are ordinarily adverse. The nature of a personal secretary's work is
such that much of the confidential material pertaining to the management passes
through his or her hands. We believe that the management should not be required to
handle such material through employees in the unit represented by the union with




retaries to the advertising manager, the classified advertising man-
ager, and the circulation manager, finding that they performed "or-
dinary secretarial work. '3 5 In a footnote, the Board distinguished
its prior holding in Indianapolis Times Publishing Co.3 6 in which
it had included secretaries to the newspaper's circulation and ad-
vertising managers in the bargaining unit because "these managers
are not at the top of the hierarchy which has the ultimate power of
management and duty to deal with the union. 37 Thus, the "labor
nexus" standard for determining "confidential" status was born,
and its purpose defined.
This standard was further elaborated on by the Board and the
courts in the years prior to the passage of the Taft-Hartley Act. In
Bull Dog Electric Products Co.,85 the Board included engineers
within an "overall" bargaining unit despite their access to certain
of the employer's confidential records. The Board's discussion em-
phasized the fact that this aspect of the engineers' duties did not
affect their status as "employees" for purposes of the entirely un-
related matter of collective bargaining as to their own wages, hours
and conditions of employment.39 Also, in Warner Brothers Pic-
tures,"° the Board held that the employer had advanced no con-
vincing reason for excluding employees of its legal, trust, and tax
departments from a bargaining unit comprised of office employ-
ees. 1 The Board routinely applied this standard in numerous cases
over the ensuing years whenever it was required to distinguish be-
35. Id. at 987. There was no evidence that their work was confidential in the sense
that the work of the secretaries to the heads of the newspaper was confidential. Id.
36. 8 N.L.R.B. 1256 (1936).
37. Brooklyn Daily Eagle, 13 N.L.R.B. at 986 n.7. See supra text accompanying note
33.
38. 22 N.L.R.B. 1043 (1940).
39. Id. at 1046.
40. 35 N.L.R,B. 739 (1941).
41. Id. at 744, stating:
While all the employees in such departments undoubtedly have access to certain
information which may be considered "confidential," the record indicates that the
same is true of the vast majority of the employees in the ... office. We have recently
held that employees must have access to confidential information which relates di-
rectly to the problem of labor relations if they are to be excluded from the unit, and
that the possession of important information is of itself not sufficient to justify depri-
vation of the right to collective bargaining.
Id. at 744 (emphasis added), citing Creamery Package Mfg. Co., 34 N.L.R.B. 108 (1941), in
which the Board included fourteen office employees who possessed access to the employer's
financial records not directly relating to labor relations within a bargaining unit while ex-
cluding one stenographer whose access to confidential information included labor relations
matters.
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tween employees possessing access to confidential labor-relations
matters and personnel files in the regular course of their duties
and employees possessing access to other forms of confidential in-
formation.4 ' The common thread throughout these cases was that
the allegedly "confidential" employees occupied "functionary"
rather than "management" positions. The "confidential" category
included only those employees who performed labor-relations func-
tions or had access to labor-relations information as part of their
regular duties, so as to override their natural community of inter-
est with other, non-confidential and non-supervisory employees.
Although in most instances the unions argued for inclusion of al-
leged "confidential" employees within the bargaining unit and the
employers contested their inclusion, the reverse was also true on
occasion.'3
Time-study employees were found to be an appropriate bargain-
ing unit in Ford Motor Co." There, the Board further narrowed
the scope of the "confidential" exclusion and, in addition, distin-
guished these employees from those deemed "managerial" or
"executive":
We have customarily excluded from bargaining units of rank and file
workers executive employees who are in a position to formulate, determine
and effectuate management policies. These employees we have considered
and still deem to be "managerial," in that they express and make operative
the decision of management.
We have also excluded from units of rank and file employees persons who
in the regular course of their duties have access to confidential data bearing
directly upon the employees' labor relations, designating them as "confiden-
tial." However, upon reappraisal, we are of the opinion that this definition
is too inclusive and needlessly precludes many employees from bargaining
collectively together with other workers having common interests. Conse-
quently, it is our intention to limit the term "confidential" so as to embrace
only those employees who assist and act in a confidential capacity to per-
sons who exercise "managerial" functions in the field of labor relations.'5
The Ford Motor Co. standard was applied by the Board in nu-
merous subsequent cases, and the Supreme Court in Hendricks
County, termed Ford Motor Co. only a slight refinement of the
Board's earlier rulings on the subject.4" The true significance of
42. Many of the cases were noted in Hendricks County, 454 U.S. at 179 n.11.
43. Montgomery Ward & Co., 38 N.L.R.B. 297 (1942) (telephone operators); Mont-
gomery Ward & Co., 36 N.L.R.B. 69 (1941) (secretaries to store managers).
44. 66 N.L.R.B. 1317 (1946).
45. Id. at 1322 (footnote omitted).
46. Hendricks County, 454 U.S. at 180-81, 188-89. Presumably, virtually all employees
1983
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Ford Motor Co., however, lies in its theory, not in its application.
The Board discerned the sharp distinction between "confidential"
and "managerial" employees in terms of the power to direct the
operations of the employing enterprise.47 It assigned the "manage-
rial" label to employees possessing such power and the "confiden-
tial" label to employees not possessing it. Mere access to informa-
tion absent an active role in assisting "managerial" personnel was
insufficient to exclude employees from the Act's coverage. The
Board also emphasized the need not to spread the "confidential"
umbrella too broadly in order to avoid excluding too many workers
from the rights of self-organization and collective bargaining.48
These considerations loom large in any discussion of the purpose
of these exclusions from "employee" coverage under the Act.
The Board's approach was considered in two cases prior to the
passage of the Taft-Hartley Act. In NLRB v. Poultrymen's Service
Corp., 9 the Third Circuit upheld the Board's inclusion of three
office employees in a bargaining unit over the employer's objection
that they had regular access to confidential business information
which did not relate to labor relations. The court stated that
"[p]ossession of confidential business information is of itself insuf-
ficient to justify deprivation of the right of collective bargaining.""e
In NLRB v. Armour & Co.,"1 the Tenth Circuit upheld the forma-
tion of a bargaining unit consisting of plant clerks, despite their
access to confidential information and their involvement in fact-
finding for the employer with respect to certain types of griev-
ances. The court reiterated the Board's standard, stating, "[the]
term 'employee' was not used by the Congress as a word of art. It
is to be given a broad and comprehensive meaning. It takes color
from its surroundings and should be read in the light of the mis-
who satisfied the Board's earlier standards for "confidential" status would, in the course of
their duties, also be assisting managers whose overall responsibilities included labor-rela-
tions functions.
47. 66 N.L.R.B. at 1322.
48. Id.
49. 138 F.2d 204 (3d Cir. 1943).
50. Id. at 211. Poultrymen's Service Corp. also originated the theory that exclusion of
a "confidential" employee from a bargaining unit does not deprive such an employee of
other benefits conferred by the Wagner Act. Although it would appear to be a strained
construction of the Act to include certain persons within its coverage for certain purposes
and to exclude them for others, this issue was not relevant to the determination in Hen-
dricks County, and was deliberately avoided by the Court. Hendricks County, 454 U.S. at
185 n.19. See also Justice Powell's dissent, id. at 197-99 (Powell, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part).
51. 154 F.2d 570 (10th Cir. 1945).
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chief to be corrected and the end to be attained. 5 2 Thus, the law
respecting "confidential" employee status was developed by the
time of the passage of the Taft-Hartley Act.
C. Effect of the Taft-Hartley Act Upon the Statutory
Definition of "Employee"
Although the Taft-Hartley Act brought about significant revi-
sions to the federal labor laws, it did not alter the basic thrust of
the NLRA-that employees should be free to organize, form, join
or assist labor organizations and to bargain collectively. Indeed,
many of the changes enacted in the Taft-Hartley Act were
designed specifically to enhance employee free choice and to pre-
clude coercion in the exercise of this right.53 As previously noted,"
the definition of the term "employee" for purposes of the NLRA's
coverage is crucial to this aim since a restrictive definition would
necessarily deprive much of the workforce of the opportunity to
avail themselves of the protections afforded by the federal labor
laws. Thus, it is remarkable that following an extended debate over
this subject, Congress made relatively few additions to the exclu-
52. Id. at 574 (footnote omitted).
53. The following revisions made by the Taft-Hartley Act are significant in this re-
gard: (1) the addition to section 7 of the rights of employees to refrain from any or all
"concerted activities" protected by the Act, 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1976 & Supp. V 1981); (2) the
revisions to section 8(a)(3) rendering illegal the "closed shop" and restricting the right of
employers to discriminate against employees for non-membership in labor organizations, id.
at §158(a)(3) (1976); (3) the addition of sections 8(b)(1)(A) and 8(b)(2) to the Act, prohibit-
ing labor organizations from restraint and coercion with respect to employee exercise of
those rights guaranteed to them by section 7, and from causing or attempting to cause em-
ployees to discriminate against employees in order to encourage or discourage membership
therein, id. at §§ 158(b)(1)(A), (b)(2) (1976); (4) the addition to section 9(a) permitting em-
ployees to adjust grievances with their employers on an individual basis provided that the
bargaining representative is afforded the opportunity to be present at the adjustment, id. at
§ 159(a) (1976 & Supp. V 1981); (5) the addition of a provision in section 9(b) permitting
professional employees to avoid being included within a bargaining unit containing non-
professional employees absent a specific vote for such inclusion, id. at § 159(b) (1976 &
Supp. V 1981); (6) the refinement of section 9(c) dealing with the secret-ballot selection of
employee representatives, and, in particular, mandating such an election upon a finding by
the Board that a question of representation exists, providing for the decertification of em-
ployee bargaining representatives, id. at § 159(c) (1976 & Supp. V 1981); (7) addition of
section 9(e), authorizing referenda to determine employee wishes with respect to establish-
ment or deauthorization of "union shop" agreements, id. at §159(e) (1976 & Supp. V 1981);
and (8) the addition of section 14(b) of the Act permitting states to enact laws barring the
establishment of "union shops" (so-called "right to work" laws), id. at § 164(b) (1976).
While the policy implications brought about by these and other provisions of the Act have
long been the subject of debate, the ostensible thrust of the Act in maximizing employee
discretion as to whether or not to engage in activities protected thereunder is clear.
54. See supra text accompanying notes 19-25.
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sions from the definition of "employee" in the Taft-Hartley Act.
Specifically, those additions related to supervisory personnel and
independent contractors." Little discussion was held respecting
other exclusions and, at the finish, the Taft-Hartley Act did not
include any specific exclusion of "confidential"-or even "manage-
rial"-employees from the definition of "employee."
Prior to the passage of the Taft-Hartley Act, "managerial" em-
ployees occupied the identical position under the law as that of
"confidential" employees. They were often, but not uniformly, ex-
cluded from the Act's coverage by application of Board policy,
even though they were not specifically excluded by statute.56 How-
ever, while the Board invariably excluded "supervisory" employees
(particularly those possessing the power to hire and fire) from bar-
gaining units composed of rank-and-file employees, it evolved a
policy of permitting many supervisors, particularly plant foremen,
to organize into separate bargaining units.57
55. 29 U.S.C. § 152(3) (1976 & Supp.V. 1981). The status of independent contractors
under the labor laws is beyond the scope of this article inasmuch as this category comprises
situations in which the employer-employee relationship is absent. This article concerns cer-
tain exclusions from the coverage of and protections afforded by such laws in situations
where such a relationship does exist.
56. The Board excluded "managerial" employees from bargaining units in numerous
cases prior to 1947. The early development of the "managerial" category is treated more
fully in Part IIIA of this article, infra at text accompanying notes 115-190.
57. Prior to the passage of the Taft-Hartley Act, the Board's protection in this respect
often varied depending upon the level within the supervisory hierarchy occupied by the
supervisory group in question. "Higher" supervisory officials, particularly those with the
power to hire and fire, were often excluded from organizing altogether, on the grounds that
they were "managerial" personnel. See, e.g., Pursglove Coal Mining Co., 71 N.L.R.B. 1455
(1947); Union Stockyards of Omaha, Ltd., 68 N.L.R.B. 770 (1946); First Nat'l Stores, Inc.,
68 N.L.R.B. 539 (1946); Essex Wire Corp., 66 N.L.R.B. 1384 (1946); Doughnut Corp. of Am.,
66 N.L.R.B. 1231 (1946); Indus. Paper Stock Co., 66 N.L.R.B. 1185 (1946); Columbia Mach.
Works, Inc., 66 N.L.R.B. 1020 (1946); Ludlow Typograph Co., 66 N.L.R.B. 1009 (1946);
Libby Owensford Glass Co., 65 N.L.R.B. 1088 (1945); Standard Nut & Bolt Co., 60 N.L.R.B.
771 (1945); Armour & Co., 60 N.L.R.B. 758 (1945); Cons.Vultee Aircraft Co., 60 N.L.R.B.
525 (1945); Seattle Drum Co., 60 N.L.R.B. 440 (1945); Sylvania Elec. Products, Inc., 59
N.L.R.B. 1298 (1944); Imperial Elec. Co., 59 N.L.R.B. 150 (1944); Radio Corp. of Am., 58
N.L.R.B. 271 (1944); Linde Air Prod. Co., 57 N.L.R.B. 1463 (1944); Crosley Corp., 56
N.L.R.B. 1722 (1944); Cramp Shipbuilding Co., 52 N.L.R.B. 309 (1943); General Motors
Corp., 51 N.L.R.B. 457 (1943); Murray Corp. of Am., 51 N.L.R.B. 94 (1943); Boeing Aircraft
Co., 51 N.L.R.B. 67 (1943); United States Cartridge Co., 50 N.L.R.B. 358 (1943). Yet, in a
surprisingly large number of pre-1947 cases, the Board took the view that certain "minor"
supervisors (particularly foremen) could lawfully bargain in separate units even if they pos-
sessed some influence over hiring, discipline, and discharge, or over the handling of em-
ployee grievances on behalf of management. See, e.g., Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 71
N.L.R.B. 1261 (1946); Sinclair Ref. Co., 69 N.L.R.B. 970 (1946); Int'l Harvester Co., 69
N.L.R..B. 926 (1946); Wheeling Steel Corp., 69 N.L.R.B. 208 (1946); General Cable Corp., 68
N.L.R.B. 660 (1946); Carnegie Illinois Steel Corp., 67 N.L.R.B. 1238 (1946); Am. Locomotive
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In Packard Co. v. NLRB, 8s the Supreme Court upheld the
Board's certification of a bargaining unit comprised of several
levels of plant foremen. During consideration by Congress of the
Taft-Hartley Act the following year, Packard sparked the first de-
bate concerning the loyalty owed by so-called "agents of manage-
ment" to their employers. Significantly, this debate focused almost
exclusively upon the problems raised by Packard with respect to
the organization of first-line supervisors and, incidentally, upon
the breadth of the "supervisory" category. Virtually none of the
debate addressed the question of the status of the "confidential" or
"managerial" employee5 9 It is not surprising that the outcome of
Co., 67 N.L.R.B. 1123 (1946); Eureka Williams Corp., 67 N.L.R.B. 1091 (1946); Kaiser
Cargo, Inc., 67 N.L.R.B. 1027 (1946); Conmar Products Corp., 67 N.L.R.B. 1021 (1946); I-T-
E Circuitbreaker Co., 67 N.L.R.B. 465 (1946); Roots Bros. Gear & Mach. Corp., 67 N.L.R.B.
318 (1946); Calif. Packing Corp., 66 N.L.R.B. 1461 (1946); Potomac Elec. Power Co., 66
N.L.R.B. 1432 (1946); Wilson & Co., 66 N.L.R.B. 1375 (1946); Allied Steel Castings Co., 66
N.L.R.B. 1026 (1946); Ludlow Typograph Co., 66 N.L.R.B. 1009 (1946); Celetex Corp., 66
N.L.R.B. 744 (1946); Kelsey-Hayes Wheel Co., 66 N.L.R.B. 570 (1946); Federal Mogul Corp.,
66 N.L.R.B. 532 (1946); B.F. Goodrich Co., 66 N.L.R.B. 204 (1946); Union Elec. Co. of Mis-
souri, 59 N.L.R.B. 276 (1944); Ingalls Shipbuilding Corp., 55 N.L.R.B. 629 (1944); Royal
Typewriter Co., 55 N.L.R.B. 402 (1944); Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co., 53 N.L.R.B. 360
(1943); Packard Motor Car Co., 47 N.L.R.B. 932 (1943); Marcus Loew Booking Agency, 38
N.L.R.B. 1015 (1942); Indianapolis Paint & Color Co., 38 N.L.R.B. 185 (1942); Western
Tablet & Stationery Co., 31 N.L.R.B. 597 (1941); Leviton Mfg. Co., 27 N.L.R.B. 735 (1940);
Shell Petroleum Corp., 9 N.L.R.B. 831 (1938). In Packard Motor Car Co., 61 N.L.R.B. 4
(1945), the Board held that the organization of foremen was consistent with the rise of mass
production industry, which industry had materially reduced the independence, authority
and policy-making responsibilities of foremen. The Board's ambivalent stance on this point
presaged the 1947 congressional debate on the status of supervisors under the Act.
58. 330 U.S. 485 (1947). The Court also upheld as appropriate a bargaining unit com-
prised of several levels of supervisors based upon their "common relationship to the enter-
prise." Id. at 491.
59. The debate in both houses of Congress centered upon two diametrically opposing
views of the propriety of permitting supervisors to organize and bargain collectively. One
view, generally held by congressional proponents of the Taft-Hartley Act, held that unioni-
zation of supervisors, particularly those exercising certain managerial functions, was incon-
sistent with federal labor policy, particularly in two respects: first, the need for employers to
have "loyal representatives in the plants," and second, the need for supervisors to be free of
influence that might be exerted upon them by unions representing rank-and-file employees.
The strong conviction on the part of many members of Congress that supervisors' unions
could not be truly "independent" of rank-and-file unions weighed heavily in the debate. See
H.R.REP. No. 245, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 13-17 (1947); S.REP. No. 105, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 3-
5 (1947). Opposition to the exclusion of foremen from the Act's coverage was, however,
forcefully expressed in both houses of Congress, although most proponents of this view sup-
ported the strict separation of supervisors' bargaining units from those of the rank-and-file.
The opponents of the revision to section 2(3) and of the creation of section 2(11) were of the
persuasion that supervisors encountered problems similar to those of other employees with
respect to their own wages, hours, and working conditions, and that they should thus not be
precluded from collective bargaining solely on the basis of their supervisory status. See
H.R.MIN. REP. No. 245, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 71-72 (1947) ("the fact that [supervisors] are,
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the congressional deliberations produced a blanket exclusion of su-
pervisors from the protection of the Taft-Hartley Act without
mention of the other categories. Specifically, a clause was added to
section 2(3) of the NLRA excluding from the definition of "em-
ployee" "any individual employed as a supervisor." The statutory
definition of "supervisor," a subject of much congressional conten-
tion, was finally incorporated as a new section of the Taft-Hartley
Act:
(11) The term "supervisor" means any individual having authority, in the
interest of the employer, to hire, transfer, suspend, lay off, recall, promote,
discharge, assign, reward, or discipline other employees, or responsibility to
direct them, or to adjust their grievances, or effectively to recommend such
action, if in connection with the foregoing the exercise of such authority is
not of a merely routine or clerical nature, but requires the use of indepen-
dent judgment.?'
This definition is identical to that contained in the original Sen-
ate version of the Taft-Hartley Act as reported from the Senate
Labor and Public Welfare Committee,"' with the sole exception of
the phrase "or effectively to recommend such action. 6 2 The
equivalent provision in section 2(12) of the House version of the
Act, as reported from the House Education and Labor Committee
and as passed by the full House was much more extensive and spe-
cifically provided for the inclusion of both "confidential" and
"managerial" personnel. 3
for some purposes, the agent of management does not derogate them from the companion
fact that even agents have an interest to protect against their principal"); S.MIN.REP. No.
105, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 39-40 (1947).
60. 29 U.S.C. § 152(11) (1976 & Supp. V 1981).
61. S. 1126, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. (1947).
62. This phrase was originally proposed as an addition to section 2(11) in an amend-
ment to S. 1126 by Senator Flanders of Vermont, which was eventually adopted. It
originated in the theory that direction of the workforce, rather than the power to hire, fire
or discipline,,lay at the heart of supervisory authority in many enterprises.
63. H.R. 3020, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. (1947). The House version defined "supervisor" as
follows:
(12) The term "supervisor" means any individual-
(A) who has authority, in the interest of the employer-
(i) to hire, transfer, suspend, lay off, recall, promote, demote, discharge,
assign, reward, or discipline any individuals employed by the employer,
or to adjust their grievances, or to effectively recommend any such ac-
tion; or,
(ii) to determine, or make effective recommendations with respect to,
the amount of wages earned by any individuals employed by the em-
ployer, or to apply, or to make effective recommendations with respect
to the application of, the factors upon the basis of which the wages of
any individuals employed by the employer are determined, if in connec-
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The House version of the term "supervisor" explicitly included
664supervisors, 4 managers," and "confidential" personnel. 66 The
House's proposal would have expanded the definition of "confiden-
tial employee" beyond that established by pre-1947 Board prece-
dent, and explicitly would have struck down the Board's develop-
ment of its "labor nexus" standard. 67 By excluding from the Act
all employees of labor relations, employment and personnel de-
partments (regardless of actual job responsibilities), all time-study
employees, and all employees with access to confidential business
information (irrespective of whether such information concerned
personnel or labor relations matters), the House version would
have excluded precisely those types of employees that had consist-
ently been included by the Board within bargaining units when-
ever a claim was raised as to their alleged "confidential" status."
However, this version did not survive the joint House-Senate Con-
ference Committee's deliberations. The Conference Committee re-
ported section 2(11) with exactly the language that was later en-
acted and is presently contained in the Taft-Hartley Act.
The statement of the House Managers appended to the Confer-
ence Report and a substantially identical summary inserted by
Senator Taft into the Congressional Record (both of which were
cited by the majority in Hendricks County69 ) provide the only
clues as to the thinking of that Committee on this point; and those
clues have a puzzling aspect to them.7 0 Apparently, both Senator
tion with the foregoing the exercise of such authority is not of a merely
routine or clerical nature, but requires the exercise of independent
judgment;
(B) who is employed in labor relations, personnel, employment, police, or
time-study matters or in connection with claims matters of employees against
employers, or who is employed to act in other respects for the employer in
dealing with other individuals employed by the employer, or who is employed
to secure and furnish to the employer information to be used by the employer
in connection with any of the foregoing; or
(C) who by the nature of his duties is given by the employer information
that is of a confidential nature, and that is not available to the public, to com-
petitors, or to employees generally, for use in the interest of the employer.
Id.
64. Id. at § A(i).
65. Id. at H8 A(ii), B.
66. Id. at §§ B, C.
67. See supra text accompanying notes 30-52.
68. See supra note 42.
69. 454 U.S. at 184-85 and nn.15 & 19.
70. The Statement of the House Managers provided as follows with regard to
"supervisors":
Supervisors-As heretofore stated, both the House bill and the Senate amendment
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Taft and the House Managers operated under the same misunder-
standing-that the Board had been excluding from coverage by the
Act all "confidential" employees regardless of their "labor nexus."
As is apparent from an examination of the Board's decisions up to
that time, this conclusion was mistaken because the Board's "con-
fidential" employee exclusion was narrower than they supposed."
Language supporting the views of the House Managers and Sena-
tor Taft was contained in the House version of the Taft-Hartley
Act, but was stricken by the Conference Committee. If the House
Managers and Senator Taft had actually intended that the Board
continue its then current practice in these areas, they would have
endorsed the relatively narrow "labor nexus" standard for "confi-
dential" exclusion 2 and the Board's pre-1947 development of the
"managerial" exclusion7 8 on a case-by-case basis.
Both the majority and the dissent in Hendricks County relied on
this statutory history in their decisions. The majority felt that the
excluded supervisors from the individuals who are to be considered employees for the
purposes of the Act. The House bill defined as "supervisors," however, certain catego-
ries of employees who were not treated as supervisors under the Senate amendment.
These were generally (A) certain personnel who fix the amount of wages earned by
other employees, such as inspectors, checkers, weighmasters, and time-study person-
nel, (B) labor relations personnel, policy and claims personnel, and (C) confidential
employees. The Senate amendment confined the definition of "supervisor" to individ-
uals generally regarded as foremen and persons of like or higher rank.
The conference agreement, in the definition of "supervisor," limits such terms to
those individuals treated as supervisors under the Senate amendment. In the case of
persons working in the labor-relations, personnel and employment departments, it
was not thought necessary to make specific provision, as was done in the House bill,
since the Board has treated, and presumably will continue to treat, such persons as
outside the scope of the Act. This is the prevailing Board practice with respect to
such people as confidential secretaries as well, and it was not the intention of the
conferees to alter this practice in any respect. The conference agreement does not
treat time-study personnel or guards as supervisors, as did the House bill. Since, how-
ever, time-study employees may qualify as professional personnel, the special provi-
sions of the Senate amendment. . . applicable with respect to professional employees
will cover many in this category.
H.R. CONF. REP. No. 510 on H.R. 3020, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 35 (1947). Senator Taft's sum-
mary on this point was identical except for a comment that, "there was a sharp divergence
between the House and Senate, however, with respect to the occupational groups which fell
within this definition. The Senate amendment, which the conference ultimately adopted, is
limited to bona fide supervisors." 93 Cong. Rec. 6599.
71. The initial House Report on H.R. 3020 made a similar error where it stated that
"[m]ost of the people who would qualify as 'confidential' employees are executives and are
excluded form the Act in any event." H.R. REP. No. 245, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 23 (1947). No
two categories of employees could be more dissimilar than "confidential" and "executive"
employees.
72. See supra text at notes 17-29.
73. See supra text at notes 115-190.
Confidential and Managerial Employees
deletion of section 2(12) of the House version of the Taft-Hartley
Act was intended as a concession to the Senate's intent not to ex-
clude all employees who have access to employer confidential busi-
ness information from the Act.74 The dissent, alternatively, con-
tended that the deletion of section 2(12) was premised solely upon
the belief that the provision was unnecessary, and that the Board's
then prevailing policy would operate to exclude all "confidential"
employees, regardless of labor nexus.7 5 Both points of view over-
stated the reliability of the Taft-Hartley's legislative history, and
neither considered the true nature of the legislative history on this
point.
Congress concerned itself almost exclusively with foremen and
other supervisors, and considered "confidential" and "managerial"
employees only in a perfunctory manner and with a fundamentally
erroneous assumption of the state of the law. If any conclusion
may be drawn from the events which led to the passage of the
Taft-Hartley Act, it is that Congress never did come to grips with
the status of these employees and that no firm consensus was
reached as to their inclusion or exclusion from the Taft-Hartley
Act. However, given the failure of Congress to enact section 2(12)
of the House version, and the eventual passage of statutory lan-
guage expressly excluding only true "supervisors," the subject mat-
ter of Packard Co. v. NLRB, e the best conclusion that can be
drawn is that Congress left the status of "confidential" and "mana-
gerial" employees unchanged. In other words, the determination of
whether "confidential" and "managerial" employees came under
the Act was left entirely to the process of case-by-case adjudication
by the Board without statutory standards.
D. Development of the "Confidential" Employee Exclusion
After the Taft-Hartley Act
Following the passage of the Taft-Hartley Act, the Board contin-
ued to apply the "labor nexus" standard as set forth in Ford Motor
Co."7 and its other pre-Taft-Hartley Act rulings on "confidential"
employees .7  Although application of the standard became more
74. Hendricks County, 454 U.S. at 184 and n.16.
75. Id.at 193 (Powell, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
76. 330 U.S. 485 (1947). See supra notes 58-59 and accompanying text.
77. 66 N.L.R.B. 1317 (1946).
78. The Board has applied the prevailing standard in many post-1947 decisions with-
out extended explanation. For a representative sample, see, e.g., N.L.R.B. v. Los Angeles
New Hospital, 640 F.2d 1017 (9th Cir. 1981); Union College, 247 N.L.R.B. 531 (1980);
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frequent and routinized, it was adapted and refined to fit varying
situations. Most of the cases were of no particular import beyond
their particular factual contexts, although a few merit comment.
For example, the Board ruled that secretaries who participate in
the bargaining process, such as those who assist an employer's la-
bor bargaining team, or who assist management officials participat-
ing in the formulation of labor contract proposals, come squarely
within the definition of "confidential" status. 9 However, such sta-
tus would not extend to front-line managers and to their secretar-
ies where their participation in the collective bargaining and con-
tract administration process was limited to the making of routine
administrative decisions implementing a collective bargaining
agreement" or to the initial-step handling of routine grievances.8 1
In addition, the Board refused to extend "confidential" status to
Stroock & Stroock & Lavan, 253 N.L.R.B. 447 (1980); Kleinberg, Kaplan, Wolff, Cohen &
Burrows, P.C., 253 N.L.R.B. 450 (1980); South Carolina Educ. Ass'n, 240 N.L.R.B. 542
(1979); Dane County Chapter, Amer. Nat'l Red Cross-Badger Regional Blood Center, 224
N.L.R.B. 323 (1976); Taft Broadcasting Co., 226 N.L.R.B. 540 (1976); News-Journal Co., 227
N.L.R.B. 568 (1976); Bulletin Co., 226 N.L.R.B. 345 (1976); Flintkote Co., 217 N.L.R.B. 497
(1975); General Dynamics Corp., Convair Aerospace Div., 213 N.L.R.B. 851 (1974); Holly
Sugar Corp., 193 N.L.R.B. 1024 (1971); Hampton Roads Maritime Ass'n, 178 N.L.R.B. 263
(1969); Chrysler Corp., 173 N.L.R.B. 1046 (1968); Ed's Foodland of Springfield, Inc., 159
N.L.R.B. 1256 (1966); Savage Arms Corp., 144 N.L.R.B. 1323 (1963); Westinghouse Elec.
Corp., 138 N.L.R.B. 778 (1962); Dinkler St. Charles Hotel Inc., 124 N.L.R.B. 1302 (1959);
Goldblatt Bros. 118 N.L.R.B. 643 (1957); B.F. Goodrich Co., 115 N.L.R.B. 722 (1956); Poto-
mac Elec. Power Co., 111 N.L.R.B. 553 (1955); Swift & Co., 98 N.L.R.B. 746 (1952); Air Line
Pilots Ass'n, 97 N.L.R.B. 929 (1951); Great Lakes Pipe Line Co., 88 N.L.R.B. 1370 (1950);
Dunn & Bradstreet, Inc., 80 N.L.R.B. 56 (1948).
79. Firestone Synthetic Latex Co., Div. of Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 201 N.L.R.B.
347 (1973); Nat'l Cash Register Co., 168 N.L.R.B. 910 (1967). In Low Bros. Nat'l Market,
Inc., 191 N.L.R.B. 432 (1971), the Board ruled that a clerical employee was "confidential"
because of her participation in numerous aspects of the company's labor relations at the
request of counsel for the union representing the company's store clerks; preparation of data
and charts used by company counsel in a Board proceeding; handling of all correspondence
between the company manager, labor relations counsel, the store clerks' union and the
Board. The fact that no other employee assisted the manager in this respect was a signifi-
cant factor in the Board's determination.
80. In Holly Sugar Corp., 193 N.L.R.B. 1024 (1971), the Board (Chairman Miller dis-
senting in part) held that secretaries to factory managers and to agricultural managers who
"police the day-to-day administration of the contract governing the plant employees" were
not "confidential" because their bosses did not "formulate, determine, and effectuate man-
agement policies with regard to labor relations." Id. at 1025 (citing B.F. Goodrich Co., 115
N.L.R.B. 722, 724 (1956)).
81. Holly Sugar Corp., 193 N.L.R.B. 1024 (1971). See Weyerhauser Co., 173 N.L.R.B.
1170 (1968); Chrysler Corp., 173 N.L.R.B. 1046 (1968). In ITT Grinnell Corp., 212 N.L.R.B.
734 (1974), the Board held that a secretary who typed documents relating to the handling of
grievances was not a "confidential" employee. In United States Postal Serv., 232
N.L.R.B.556 (1977), the Board held that secretaries could not be considered "confidential"
by virtue of the fact that they typed merit evaluations and other personnel documents.
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employees who assisted persons whose roles in labor relations were
strictly advisory or who were consulted from time-to-time for in-
formation bearing upon labor relations policies but who did not
play any role in the actual formulation or implementation of those
policies.8 2 Furthermore, access to or assistance in the preparation
of personnel or statistical data relating to the employer's workforce
records or to confidential financial information or trade secrets un-
related to the employer's labor relations policies did not suffice to
exclude a person from the Act.83 Consequently, the Board's policy
82. Thus, in Holly Sugar Corp., the Board said that the fact that the company's fac-
tory managers and agricultural managers were consulted by corporate officials prior to the
commencement of collective bargaining negotiations did not constitute sufficient reason to
designate their secretaries as "confidential." In Flintkote Co., 217 N.L.R.B. 497 (1975), pro-
ject engineers were deemed not to be "confidential" in spite of their responsibilities in con-
nection with assisting plant managers, since those responsibilities concerned the provision of
technical advice, i.e., "helping to increase efficiency and to solve various production
problems," and had little or nothing to do with labor relations. Id. at 499. In Weyerhauser
Co., the Board included several secretaries within a bargaining unit despite the fact that
their bosses were consulted by corporate officials with respect to wages and personnel mat-
ters for the purpose of developing "approaches" to collective bargaining and other labor
relations matters. 173 N.L.R.B. at 1173. In Consolidated Papers, Inc., 179 N.L.R.B. 165
(1969), the Board included within a bargaining unit a secretary whose boss prepared and
oversaw, among other matters, salary data, pay scales, and quality control information, and
made recommendations in those subject areas to the company's Industrial Relations Depart-
ment, stating that these duties might "entail the reporting of factual data and recommenda-
tions which may ultimately have an impact on employment conditions but do not in them-
selves cbnstitute labor relations policy." Id. at 166. See also Vulcanized Rubber & Plastics
Co., 129 N.L.R.B. 1256 (1961); American Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp., 119 N.L.R.B.
1715 (1958); Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 89 N.L.R.B. 8 (1950); Eastern Corp., 116 N.L.R.B.
329 (1956).
83. Thus, in RCA Communications, Inc., 154 N.L.R.B. 34 (1965), the Board included a
payroll clerk within a bargaining unit in spite of the fact that she prepared payroll records,
maintained sick leave, absentee, lateness and vacation reports, and was required to inform
her employer of instances of excessive absenteeism or tardiness. In Hampton Roads Mari-
time Ass'n, 178 N.L.R.B. 263 (1969), and Pacific Far East Line, 174 N.L.R.B. 1168 (1969),
timekeepers were held not to be "confidential" employees on the grounds that the informa-
tion to which they had access had nothing to do with labor relations matters, and that they
did not participate in the formulation or implementation of their employer's labor relations
policies. In Ladish Co., 178 N.L.R.B. 90 (1969), the Board held that employees having access
to personnel records and to other information that, if brought to the attention of manage-
ment, could lead to discipline of fellow employees, could not be deemed "confidential." See
also Air Express Int'l Corp., 245 N.L.R.B. 478 (1979); Beatrice Foods Co., John Sexton &
Co. 224 N.L.R.B. 1341 (1976); KOWB Radio, 222 N.L.R.B. 530 (1976); General Dynamics
Corp., Convair erospace Div., 213 N.L.R.B. 851 (1974); Victor Indus. Corp. of Cal. 215
N.L.R.B. 48 (1974); Trans World Airlines, Inc., 211 N.L.R.B. 733 (1974); R.H. Macy Co.,
Inc., Davison Paxson Co., 185 N.L.R.B. 21 (1970); Budd Co., 154 N.L.R.B. 421 (1965); West-
inghouse Elec. Corp., 138 N.L.R.B. 778 (1962); Swift & Co., 129 N.L.R.B. 1391 (1961);
Dorhrmann Commercial Co., 127 N.L.R.B. 205 (1960); Dinkler-St. Charles Hotel, 124
N.L.R.B. 1302 (1959); Great Lakes Pipe Line Co., 88 N.L.R.B. 1370 (1950), all of which deny
"confidential" status with respect to employees having access to personnel records, financial
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did not xtend "confidential" status solely on the basis of an em-
ployee's access to or compilation of information, unless that infor-
mation directly pertained to bargaining strategy, proposals formu-
lated for collective bargaining or other materials clearly within the
ambit of their employer's labor relations; even then, that status
was not invariably conferred.""
Under the "labor nexus" standard, an employee's "confidential"
duties must constitute a regular and necessary component of his or
her duties. Employees who performed "confidential" work on an
information or information impacting upon the competitive position of their employers on
the grounds of an insufficient "labor nexus." See also Kleinberg, Kaplan, Wolff, Cohen &
Burrows, P.C., 253 N.L.R.B. 450 (1980); and Stroock & Stroock & Lavin, 253 N.L.R.B. 447
(1980) (in which the Board asserted jurisdiction over clerical and support staffs of the law
firms denying allegations that such staffs were, by definition, "confidential").
84. This pattern is clearly demonstrated by an examination of those cases in which the
Board did exclude employees from bargaining units as "confidential," virtually all of which
contained findings that the disputed employees either actively participated in the formula-
tion and implementation of labor relations policies or had regular access to corporate offi-
cials who did. See, e.g., Compton Hill Medical Center, 251 N.L.R.B. 1547 (1980) (excluding
secretaries to department heads who, as members of a hospital's administrative counsel,
formulated labor relations policies and determined management proposals and strategies
during contract negotiations); South Carolina Educ. Ass'n, 240 N.L.R.B. 542 (1979) (exclud-
ing the personal secretary to a union employer's associate executive director who served on
three occasions on the employer's bargaining team-twice as chief negotiator-and who had
full and regular access to the employer's bargaining proposals and strategies); Prince Gard-
ner, Div. of Swank, Inc., 231 N.L.R.B. 96 (1977) (excluding a personnel assistant and a per-
sonnel department receptionist who worked closely with the employer's personnel manager
who, in turn, had full charge of the employer's day-to-day labor relations activities, and who
had full access to his records); Stouffer's Cincinnati Inn, 225 N.L.R.B. 1196 (1976) (exclud-
ing the secretary to the hotel's general manager who served as overall supervisor of the hotel
staff and set their wages and fringe benefits); Connecticut Light & Power Co., 222 N.L.R.B.
1243 (1976) (excluding the secretary to the district manager who compiled and submitted
data used in formulating labor relations policies, served on the employer's collective bar-
gaining committee, and handled second-step grievances). See also Southern Maryland Elec.
Coop., 220 N.L.R.B. 979 (1975); West Chem. Prods., Inc., 221 N.L.R.B. 250 (1975); Litton
Fin. Printing, 216 N.L.R.B. 380 (1975); Chico Community Memorial Hosp., 215 N.L.R.B.
821 (1974); General Truck Drivers, Local 692, 209 N.L.R.B. 1144 (1974); Bank of Am. Nat'l
Trust & Savings Ass'n, 196 N.L.R.B. 591 (1972); Moore-McCormack Lines, Inc., 181
N.L.R.B. 510 (1970); Nat'l Cash Register Co., 168 N.L.R.B. 910 (1967) (pertaining to the
private secretaries to the employer's division managers); Ed's Foodland of Springfield, Inc.,
159 N.L.R.B. 1256 (1966); Locomotive Firemen & Enginemen, 145 N.L.R.B. 1521 (1964);
ACF Indus., Inc., 145 N.L.R.B. 403 (1963); Vulcanized Rubber & Plastics Co., 129 N.L.R.B.
1256 (1961) (pertaining to secretaries to the controller, personnel manager, research man-
ager, and plastics division manager); Katz Drug Co., 123 N.L.R.B. 1615 (1959); Threads,
Inc., 121 N.L.R.B. 1507 (1958); Eljer Co., 108 N.L.R.B. 1417 (1954); Ohio Steel Foundry Co.,
92 N.L.R.B. 683 (1950). The Board has even denied "confidential" status to employees in a
few cases where their involvement in confidential labor relations matters was limited to typ-
ing memoranda and letters. See, e.g., United States Postal Serv., 232 N.L.R.B. 556 (1978)
and NLRB v. Los Angeles New Hosp., 640 F.2d 1017 (9th Cir. 1981).
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occasional, substitute, or "overflow" basis, 5 and those who might
inadvertently overhear or transmit confidential labor relations in-
formation were not deemed to be "confidential." 6 Indeed, the
Board was remarkably consistent in applying a strict "labor nexus"
standard to a virtually innumerable array of differing fact situa-
tions involving the alleged "confidential" status of different groups
of employees.
8 7
The Board intentionally adopted an extremely restrictive ap-
proach to the application of "confidential" status in an apparent
effort not to exclude employees from bargaining units absent a
clear showing of need for the exclusion. The grounds for this ap-
proach are apparently that the "confidential" exclusion operates in
derogation of the statutory rights of such employees to organize
and collectively bargain and, thus, that exclusion ought to be ap-
plied as sparingly as possible. The Board has never wavered from
this approach.88
85. Determinations in this area are concerned largely with the status of switchboard,
telegraph, and teletype operators, whom the Board has uniformly refused to characterize as
"confidential." See, e.g., Aeronca, Inc., 221 N.L.R.B. 326 (1975) (PBX operator); Swift &
Co., 119 N.L.R.B. 1556 (1958) (clerks in the shipping and processing departments); Indiana
Hotel Co., 125 N.L.R.B. 629 (1959) (PBX operator); B.F. Goodrich Co., 115 N.L.R.B. 722
(1956) (telephone operator); F.H. McGraw & Co., 106 N.L.R.B. 624 (1953) (telephone opera-
tor); Brady Aviation Corp., 104 N.L.R.B. 220 (1953) (PBX operator).
86. 115 N.L.R.B. 722 (1956). The terms "formulate, determine and effectuate" are to
be used "in the conjunctive." Weyerhauser Co., 173 N.L.R.B. 1170, 1172 (1968).
87. The Board's Ford Motor Co. policy was reaffirmed in unmistakable terms in B.F.
Goodrich Co.:
Since the early Ford Motor Company case, in which definitions theretofore ac-
corded the term "confidential employees" were reexamined, the Board has consist-
ently excluded from bargaining units as confidential employees persons who assist
and act in a confidential capacity to persons who formulate, determine, and effectuate
management policies in the field of labor relations. Although announcing its intention
in the Ford Motor Company case to limit the term "confidential" so as to embrace
only such employees, the Board has, from time to time since that decision, expanded
its views as to what constitutes a confidential employee by designating as "confiden-
tial," for example, secretaries to persons involved in the handling of grievances and
cashiers having access to labor relations policy data. Upon further reexamination of
our holdings in the instant connection, we are still of the opinion expressed in the
Ford Motor Company case that any broadening of the definition of the term "confi-
dential" as adopted in that decision needlessly precludes employees from bargaining
collectively together with other employees sharing common interests. Consequently, it
is our intention herein and in future cases to adhere strictly to that definition and
thus to limit the term "confidential" so as to embrace only those employees who as-
sist and act in a confidential capacity to persons who formulate, determine, and effec-
tuate management policies in the field of labor relations.
115 N.L.R.B. at 724 (footnotes omitted).
88. See supra note 83. The Board's decision in Kleinberg, Kaplan, Wolff, Cohen &
Burrows, P.C., 253 N.L.R.B. 450 (1980), some 24 years later, elaborated on the consequences
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The "labor nexus" standard escaped serious judicial scrutiny for
a quarter-century following its inception. Very few decisions on the
subject were rendered by the courts during this period, and these
involved merely the Board's application of the standard to particu-
lar employees in specific factual contexts.8 9 However, the standard
itself came under fire in three separate federal circuits.
In NLRB v. Wheeling Electric Co.,90 the Fourth Circuit over-
turned a finding of the Board that an employer had violated sec-
tion 8(a)(1) of the Act by discharging a "confidential" secretary
who had refused to report for work during a strike. The court re-
jected the Board's view that the secretary had engaged in pro-
tected concerted activity under the Act by refusing to cross a pick-
et line. It held that the clear intent of Congress was to not afford
of abandoning the policies announced in Ford Motor Co. and B.F. Goodrich Co., as follows:
[D]iscarding the Board's consistently applied definition of "confidential employees"
as those individuals who assist and act in a confidential capacity to persons who for-
mulate, determine, and effectuate management policies in the field of labor relations,
to redefine them as those individuals who have access to secret information would
have far-reaching results. A confidential business information standard, even if lim-
ited to information that constitute "trade secrets," would deprive of protection under
the Act every employee who has access to . . . " [a]ny formula, pattern, device or
compilation of information which is used in one's business, and which gives him an
opportunity to obtain an advantage over competitors who do not know or use it. It
may be a formula for a chemical compound, a process of manufacturing, treating or
preserving materials, a pattern for a machine or other device, or a list of customers."
Clearly, such a definition would vitiate collective organization by large numbers of
both white and blue-collar employees already organized, since many, in the normal
course of their duties, have access to such information. Moreover, the future impact
of this broader standard would be incalculable. The Bureau of Labor Statistics has
projected that, by 1990, the economy will have created nearly 20 million new jobs,
well over half of which will be in white-collar occupations. In the white-collar cate-
gory, clerical employees, which includes bank tellers, bookkeepers, cashiers, secretar-
ies, and typists, are the fastest growing group. Many of these new workers would have
access to confidential information in the broader sense. As a consequence, in future
years, a rapidly growing percentage of workers in the work force would be deprived of
rights under the Act. If Congress intended a result so revolutionary, we believe that it
would have said so expressly.
253 N.L.R.B. at 456-57 (footnotes and citations omitted).
89. NLRB v. Los Angeles New Hosp., 640 F.2d 1017 (9th Cir. 1981) (upholding Board
determinations that challenged employees were not "confidential"); Union Oil Co. v. NLRB,
607 F.2d 852 (9th Cir. 1979) (upholding Board determination); Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v.
NLRB, 398 F.2d 669 (6th Cir. 1968) (upholding Board determinations that challenged em-
ployees were not "confidential"); NLRB v. Quaker City Life Ins. Co., 319 F.2d 690 (4th Cir.
1963) (overruling Board's determination that challenged employee was not "confidential");
NLRB v. Swift & Co., 292 F.2d 561 (1st Cir. 1961). See also NLRB v. Allied Prod. Corp.,
Richard Bros, Div., 548 F.2d 644 (6th Cir. 1977), in which the courts strongly defended the
use (if not the particular application) of the "labor nexus" standard.
90. 444 F.2d 783 (4th Cir. 1971).
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"confidential" employees any of the protections of the Act.9"
On its face, the Fourth Circuit's decision addressed only the
question sidestepped by the majority opinion in Hendricks
County,92 i.e., whether a "confidential" employee enjoys the pro-
tection of the Act in addition to the right to belong to a labor or-
ganization. However, the Fourth Circuit chose to go one step fur-
ther by holding that the legislative history of the Taft-Hartley Act
somehow evidenced the intent of Congress to include "confiden-
tial" employees within the category of "supervisors. "9s This ap-
proach runs contrary to the actual course of that legislative history
which, as has already been noted,94 evidenced anything but a clear
intent. Rather, it showed a lack of serious attention to the "confi-
dential" employee, a split within both houses of Congress as to the
proper scope of that category, and a decision to avoid treating the
issue by way of specific statutory language in favor of permitting
the Board to develop the law in this area.
The greater significance of the Fourth Circuit's decision, how-
ever, lies in its apparent rejection of the Board's emphasis upon
the actual duties performed by "confidential" employees with re-
spect to assisting persons who formulate and implement labor rela-
tions policies, and its substitution of an emphasis upon the subjec-
tive loyalty, which the court deemed "confidential" secretaries owe
their employers.
95
This approach was also endorsed by the Seventh Circuit in its
decision in Peerless of America v. NLRB, 9' in which it was held
91. Id. at 786. The court explicitly disagreed with the determination of the Fifth Cir-
cuit in NLRB v. Southern Greyhound Lines, 426 F.2d 1299 (5th Cir. 1970) (pr esenting the
same issue).
92. 454 U.S. 170 (1981).
93. 444 F.2d at 785.
94. See supra text and accompanying notes at 62-73.
95. 444 F.2d at 788. The court stated that:
A confidential secretary who plights her troth with the union differs in form, but
not in substance, from one who holds a union card. Since she cannot formally join the
unit, there is nothing incongruous in holding that she cannot "plight her troth" with
the unit. Indeed, it seems more consistent to say that if she cannot act in concert by
participating in the unit, then she cannot act in concert on an informal basis, or more
accurately, that if she does so, it will be without the protection of the Act. Manage-
ment is entitled to security of its confidential information and may insist upon the
loyalty of those employees who have access to it. For this reason, confidential employ-
ees cannot be granted the protection afforded ordinary employees under the Act. Like
supervisors, "such loyalty cannot be secured if [they] are psychologically allied with,
or subject to the pressures of their union on behalf of, the rank-and-file."
Id. (citations omitted).
96. 484 F.2d 1108 (7th Cir. 1973).
1983
Duquesne Law Review Vol. 22:1
that a confidential secretary was by definition a "supervisor" and
thus not an "employee under the Act."'97 The Eighth Circuit faced
a similar situation in NLRB v. North Arkansas Electric Coopera-
tive,98 where an employer's refusal to reinstate a "managerial" em-
ployee who had failed to remain neutral in a union organization
campaign was overturned.9 9 The North Arkansas court implied
that the "confidential employee" category could conceivably be
broadened to include persons other than those "working in labor
relations, personnel and employment divisions," i.e., that a "labor
nexus" was not necessarily a prerequisite to "confidential"
status. 00
The growing skepticism of the courts toward the Board's ap-
proach to "confidential" status reached its peak in Hendricks
County,10' which represented the first direct assault on the Board's
development of the law in this area. At issue in Hendricks County
was the attempt by an employer to discharge the general man-
ager's personal secretary for signing a petition calling for the rein-
statement of an injured employee, dismissed for engaging in an ac-
tivity that was admittedly protected by section 7 of the Act. 02 The
Board, utilizing its "labor nexus" standard, initially ruled that the
employer's discharge of the secretary had violated section 8(a)(1)
97. Id. at 1112.
98. 446 F.2d 602 (8th Cir. 1971).
99. Id. at 607. The court relied heavily upon two statements contained in the House
Report accompanying the original House version of the Taft-Hartley Act: the statement
that "most of the people who would qualify as 'confidential' employees are executives and
are excluded from the Act in any event" and the assertion that "the bill. . . excludes from
the definition of employee persons holding positions of trust and confidence whose duties
give them secret information." Id. at 606. As noted earlier, the former assertion was based
on a clear misunderstanding of the status of "confidential" employees before and since; and
the latter statement refers to a provision of the House bill that was subsequently stricken by
the House-Senate Conference Committee. This case does not directly bear upon the status
of "confidential" employees since it involved "managerial" employees. However, the court
did take the opportunity to discuss the basis and extent of the exclusion of "supervisory,"
"confidential," and "managerial" employees from the coverage of the Act. In particular, the
court read the legislative history of the Taft-Hartley Act as indicating the following intent
of Congress:
It is apparent that in passing the Labor-Management Relations Act of 1947, Con-
gress understood that persons working in labor relations, personnel and employment
division and as confidential employees had theretofore been treated as "outside the
scope of the Act," and that it was the intention of the conferees [that] this practice
be continued under the 1947 amendments.
Id. at 607.
100. Id. at 610.
101. Hendricks County Rural Elec. Membership Corp., 236 N.L.R.B. 1616 (1978),
rev'd, 603 F.2d 25 (7th Cir. 1979), rev'd, 454 U.S. 170 (1981).
102. Id.
Confidential and Managerial Employees
of the Act, specifically rejected the argument that the secretary
was "confidential," and ordered her reinstatement with back
pay. 103
The Seventh Circuit, however, by a two-to-one majority, re-
versed the Board's determination and held that the Board's appli-
cation of the "labor nexus" standard was erroneous.'0 The court
relied heavily upon the legislative history of the Taft-Hartley Act
and upon the United States Supreme Court's decision in NLRB v.
Bell Aerospace Co., Division of Textron, Inc.10 5 in advancing the
view that all confidential secretaries (the word "confidential" de-
noting the title conferred by the employer rather than the legal
definition developed and applied by the Board) were excluded
from the Act's coverage, not merely those working for individuals
engaged in labor relations.106 The court ruled that the secretary
must be deemed "confidential" if "'by the nature of her duties'
she was 'given by the employer information that is of a confidential
nature, and that is not available to the public, to competitors or to
employees generally for use in the interest of the employer.' ,,107
The matter was remanded to the Board for a determination of the
affected employee's status under its broader "confidential"
exclusion.108
On remand, the Board ruled that the employee was not "confi-
dential," even under the Seventh Circuit's new criteria, and rein-
stated its earlier order.109 The employer again appealed to the Sev-
103. Id. at 1618. The Board characterized the employer's reasons for her discharge,
apart form her signing of the petition, as "pretextual." Id.
104. Hendricks County Rural Elec. Membership Corp. v. NLRB, 603 F.2d 25 (7th Cir.
1979), rev'd, 454 U.S. 170 (1981). The court did agree with the Board's finding that the
employee's signing of the petition at issue constituted the reason for her discharge, and that
such activity was "protected" by the Act. In this respect, the court took note of the adminis-
trative law judge's finding that "the petition was motivated in part by the employees' desire
to promote their own future well-being should they be faced with a similar misfortune." Id.
at 27.
105. Id. at 29-30.
106. 603 F.2d at 30. Judge Bonsai, in dissent, argued that the affected employee was
"not a 'confidential secretary' and was covered by the Act." Id. (Bonsal, J., dissenting).
107. 603 F.2d at 30 (quoting H.R. 3020, 80th Cong., 1st Sess., § 2(12)(c) (1947)).
108. Id.
109. 247 N.L.R.B. 498 (1980). The Board's disagreement with the Seventh Circuit's
formulation of its expanding "confidential" exclusion could not have been more apparent.
At the outset, the Board explicitly confined the Seventh Circuit's standard to the status of
"the law of this case only." The Board's subsequent analysis dealt almost entirely with the
extent of the affected employee's involvement with labor relations and personnel matters. It
made only two findings with respect to her "confidential" duties in other areas: that she did
not maintain secret or classified papers or documents, and that the record did not contain
evidence of any confidential duties performed by her in non-labor relations or personnel
1983
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enth Circuit, and a two-to-one majority determined that the Board
had failed to properly apply the court's standards.11 The court re-
fused to enforce the Board's order. This decision, together with the
companion case of Malleable Iron Range Co. v. NLRB,"' was re-
viewed by the United States Supreme Court.' l
The Seventh Circuit's decision and Justice Powell's dissenting
opinion in Hendricks County were both grounded on the same the-
oretical base-Congress had intended a broader "confidential em-
ployee" exclusion than had been developed by the Board and the
policies advanced by the Supreme Court in Bell Aerospace."' The
relevant legislative history does not bear out this contention.11
4
These decisions have also confused the purpose of the "confiden-
tial" exclusion with that of the entirely distinct "managerial em-
ployee" exclusion. The "managerial" category's history and pur-
pose are vastly different from those of the "confidential" category,
and an examination of the "managerial" exclusion is essential to an
understanding of the proper scope of the Act's coverage.
III. THE "MANAGERIAL" EMPLOYEE EXCLUSION
A. Evolution of the "Managerial" Employee Exclusion
Bell Aerospace'" decided an issue involving "managerial" em-
ployees analogous to the "confidential" employees issue treated in
Hendricks County."" In Bell Aerospace the Court held that all
matters. Id. at 498-99.
110. Hendricks County Rural Elec. Membership Corp. v. NLRB, 627 F.2d 766 (7th
Cir. 1980). Judge Cudahy dissented, stating that the court's opinion would subject the af-
fected employee to a "lamentable injustice;" that the record contained nothing to indicate
that her job duties necessitated her loss of those protections conferred by the Act; and that
the court's reliance upon dicta contained in Bell Aerospace was overstated. Id. at 770-72
(Cudahy, J., dissenting).
111. 244 N.L.R.B. 485 (1979), enf. denied mem, Seventh Circuit (19 ). Malleable Iron
Range Co. involved an employer's challenge to a labor union's attempt to include eighteen
employees, whom it claimed had access to confidential business information, within a bar-
gaining unit of office, clerical, technical, and professional employees. The Board rejected this
challenge. The union was successful in the ensuing representation election and was certified.
The employer subsequently refused to bargain with the union and was found to have com-
mitted unfair labor practices under sections 8(a)(1) and 8(a)(5) of the Act. The-Board issued
a bargaining order, 244 N.L.R.B. 487 (1979), which the Seventh Circuit refused to enforce
on the ground that the Board had improperly applied a "labor nexus" test rather than the
broader standard set forth in its two Hendricks County decisions.
112. Hendricks County, 454 U.S. at 170.
113. 416 U.S. 267 (1974).
114. See supra text accompanying notes 53-75.
115. 416 U.S. 267 (1974).
116. 603 F.2d 25 (7th Cir. 1979).
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"managerial" employees, not merely those working in the field of
labor relations or those whose participation in a labor union would
give rise to a conflict of interest with their job responsibilities, are
excluded from the Act.11 7 The majority opinion was written by Jus-
tice Powell, the author of the dissenting opinion in Hendricks
County. Both of Justice Powell's opinions were premised upon the
similarity in the form of the questions posed: What is the proper
breadth of these two employee categories excluded from the Act's
protection? However, the similarity between the issues addressed
by those cases and the policy implications raised by them ends
there.
Bell Aerospace involved a group of employees whose characteris-
tics, interests and need for the protections afforded by the Act
were strikingly different from those of the employees in Hendricks
County. In Bell Aerospace a union attempted to organize a bar-
gaining unit composed of buyers and assistant buyers in the em-
ployer's purchasing department. The employer challenged the
union's effort on the ground that the affected employees were part
of its "managerial team," citing their discretion in selecting the
company's suppliers, drafting bid invitations, evaluating submitted
bids, negotiating prices and terms of purchase, and preparing
purchase orders. A majority of the Board ruled that the buyers
might be "managerial" employees, but were nevertheless covered
by the Act in the absence of a specific showing that their organiza-
tion would unavoidably create a conflict of interest "I with the du-
ties of their employment. The Board called the employer's allega-
tions of such conflict unsupported conjecture.ll 9
The employer subsequently petitioned the Board for reconsider-
ation of its decision in view of the Eighth Circuit's intervening de-
cision in NLRB v. North Arkansas Electric Cooperative.1 20 The
117. 416 U.S. at 289 (1974). Bell Aerospace also determined that the Board might
properly determine whether certain employees are "managerial" by case-by-case adjudica-
tion and that it need not utilize a quasi-legislative rulemaking process. Id. at 294. For a
discussion of this issue, see Note, NLRB Policymaking: The Rulemaking-Adjudication Di-
lemma Revisited in NLRB v. Bell Aerospace, 29 U. MAMI L. Ray. 559 (1975).
118. 190 N.L.R.B. 431-32 (1971). The Board rejected the employer's contention that
unionization of the buyers would create a conflict of interest between their role as union
members and their role as the employer's representative as "unsupported conjecture." It
said the employer could establish general directions within which the buyer's discretion
could be confined. Id. The Board relied in part on its decision in North Arkansas Electric
Coop., 185 N.L.R.B. 550 (1970), which held that "managerial" status did not necessarily
preclude employees from the Act's coverage. See infra note 138.
119. 190 N.L.R.B. at 432.
120. 446 F.2d 602 (8th Cir. 1971). The court held that "managerial" employees as a
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petition was denied by the Board, based on its view that the "man-
agerial" exclusion should extend only to those "managerial" em-
ployees whose duties and responsibilities either (1) pertained to
the formulation and implementation of labor relations policies or
(2) necessarily involved determinations that could lead to conflicts
of interest.' The employer then refused to bargain with the af-
fected employees, and the Board issued a bargaining order.1
22
The Second Circuit denied enforcement of the Board's order on
the ground that the Board had applied an overly narrow "manage-
rial" standard. 12  The Court held that "managerial" status was ap-
plicable to all employees who participated in the formulation, de-
termination, and implementation of the employer's policies
exercising discretion and independent judgment in that connec-
tion, regardless of labor relations involvement or potential conflicts
of interest.2 4 The case thus presented an issue of the propriety of
the "labor nexus" and "conflict of interest" tests in determining
''managerial" status.
Justice Powell's majority opinion was, to a large degree, both a
parallel and a precursor to his Hendricks County dissent. He noted
that a considerable number of early Board decisions had excluded
certain groups of employees deemed "managerial" (most promi-
nently, buyers and expediters) from rank-and-file bargaining units
on the theory that they were "closely related to management;" that
they were empowered to make commitments on behalf of their em-
ployers; or that they exercised considerable discretion in the for-
mulation, determination, and effectuation of management policy.12 6
class were not covered by the Act. This case was discussed with respect to "confidential"
employees. See supra text accompanying note 98.
121. 196 N.L.R.B. 827 (1972). The Board explicitly stated its disagreement with North
Arkansas and declined to follow that court's broader view of the "managerial" exclusion
from the Act.
122. 197 N.L.R.B. 209 (1972).
123. 475 F.2d 485 (2d Cir. 1973).
124. Id. The court remanded the matter to the Board for a redetermination of the
status of the employer's buyers under a broader "managerial" standard, further suggesting
that the Board utilize its rulemaking authority under 29 U.S.C. § 156 to develop appropriate
guidelines. The court did indicate that certain buyers, including those involved in the Bell
Aerospace proceedings, might not occupy places sufficiently high in the corporate hierarchy
to constitute "managerial" employees, even under its formulation.
125. 416 U.S. at 276. Justice Powell's opinion cited the following cases: Electric Con-
troller & Mfg. Co., 69 N.L.R.B. 1242 (1946); Barrett Div., Allied Chem. & Dye Corp., 65
N.L.R.B. 903 (1946); Vulcan Corp. 58 N.L.R.B. 733 (1944); Spicer Mfg. Corp., 55 N.L.R.B.
1441 (1944); Hudson Motor Co., 55 N.L.R.B. 509 (1944); Dravo Corp., 54 N.L.R.B. 1174
(1944); Freiz & Sons, 47 N.L.R.B. 43 (1943). These cases dealt only with the propriety of
including allegedly "managerial" employees within rank-and-file bargaining units and not
Vol. 22:1
Confidential and Managerial Employees
He also placed great reliance upon the legislative history of the
Taft-Hartley Act, reaching the conclusion that Congress had in-
tended the uniform exclusion of "managerial" employees from the
Act. 2 In view of the focus of that legislative history upon "super-
visors" rather than upon the somewhat different class of persons
generally within the executive hierarchy (a class which received
very little congressional attention in 1947),127 this reliance may
have been overstated. Finally, Justice Powell noted that since the
passage of the Taft-Hartley Act, the Board had almost invariably
excluded "managerial" employees, i.e., those who "formulate and
effectuate management policies by expressing and making opera-
tive the decisions of their employer,' 23 from the Act, and that va-
rious courts of appeals had upheld this exclusion.1
29
Justice Powell explicitly linked his reasoning to both "confiden-
tial" and "managerial" employees. In footnote twelve to his Bell
Aerospace opinion, he commented that "confidential" employees
were excluded from the Act's coverage, regardless of "labor
nexus." 30 His opinion cited the portion of the House Report at-
tached to the House's version of what subsequently became the
Taft-Hartley Act which stated that "[m]ost of the people who
would qualify as 'confidential employees' are executives and are ex-
cluded from the Act in any event." 13' Justice Powell's dicta was
heavily relied upon by the Seventh Circuit in both of its Hendricks
County opinions, 2 but rejected by the Supreme Court in Hen-
dricks County.'3
Justice White's concurring and dissenting opinion in Bell Aero-
space" bore a strong resemblance to Justice Brennan's majority
opinion in Hendricks County. Both opinions supported the appli-
cation of a "labor nexus" test to "managerial" status. Thus, while
Justice Powell found support in the congressional debates and
with the issue of whether such employees could organize into separate bargaining units.
126. 416 U.S. at 283-84.
127. See supra text accompanying notes 53-72.
128. 416 U.S. at 286 (quoting Palace Laundry Dry Cleaning Corp., 75 N.L.R.B. 320,
323 n.4 (1947)).
129. See 416 U.S. at 288-89 and cases cited therein.
130. Id. at 283-84 n.12.
131. Id. See also supra note 71 and accompanying text.
132. 603 F.2d 25, 28-29 (7th Cir. 1979); 627 F.2d 766, 768-69 (7th Cir. 1980). Judge
Cudahy, in his dissent to the latter opinion, criticized the court's attempt to "build a whole
new body of law about 'confidential employees' uninvolved in labor relations on the footnote
dicta of Bell Aerospace." Id. at 771.
133. 454 U.S. at 186-87.
134. 416 U.S. at 295 (White, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
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committee reports for his broad view of the "managerial" exclu-
sion, Justice White cited the lack of any statutory "managerial"
exclusion, the narrowness and precision of the "supervisory" exclu-
sion contained in section 2(11) of the Taft-Hartley Act, and the
Act's inclusion of professional employees under section 2(12)
(many of whom exercised at least some functions that could be
deemed "managerial") for his view that Congress intended the
"managerial" exclusion be applied more narrowly. Justice White
also noted that prior to 1947 the Board had never held "manage-
rial" employees to be excluded from the Act altogether. Rather, it
had only addressed the narrower issue of whether such employees
possessed sufficient community of interest with rank-and-file em-
ployees to appropriately be included within those collective
units.
138
A lengthy discussion on the legislative history of the Taft-Hart-
ley Act's exclusion of "supervisors" followed, with Justice White
declaring that Congress had rejected any specific exclusion for
"managerial" employees by adopting the narrower Senate exclu-
sion which was limited to true "supervisors." He declared that: (1)
the Board had never excluded "managerial" employees as a class
from the Act's coverage and (2) Congress had not directed that
such a blanket exclusion be made."3 6 Finally, Justice White noted
that in only two cases since the passage of the Taft-Hartley Act
had the Board held that employees aligned with or acting as repre-
sentatives of mahagement could not organize even into separate
bargaining units' 5 7 -a position which he deemed overruled by the
Board's application of the "labor nexus" standard in North Arkan-
135. 416 U.S. at 299-300. Justice White took the position that the Board's likely posi-
tion on the broader issue of the ability of "managerial" employees to organize ab initio was
uncertain, particularly given the vacillation shown by the pre-1947 Board with respect to
the question of whether "supervisors" were "employees" under the Act and whether they
could therefore lawfully organize into separate collective bargaining units. Id. at 300.
136. Id. at 302-03. Justice White also noted that the dissenting opinion of Justice
Douglas in Packard Co. v. NLRB, 330 U.S. 485 (1947), had specifically referred to persons
acting for management in the formulation and execution of labor relations policies. 416 U.S.
at 307. Packard was the decision that played such a prominent role in spurring congres-
sional action in 1947 to amend the Wagner Act "to include a specific exclusion of supervi-
sors." While his contention might be somewhat overstated, it cannot be doubted that the
emphasis placed upon supervisors in the 1947 congressional debates-and particularly po-
tential conflicts between their roles as such and their membership in labor organiza-
tions-indicated that Congress was indeed most concerned about the status of persons exer-
cising supervisory and/or managerial authority in the labor relations area as opposed to
other areas of business decisionmaking. Id. at 307-08.
137. 416 U.S. at 309. See Swift & Co., 115 N.L.R.B. 752 (1956) (dealing with procure-
ment drivers); American Locomotive Co., 92 N.L.R.B 115 (1950) (dealing with buyers).
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sas Electric."38
Justice White contended that the Board's application of a "labor
nexus" standard to "managerial" status had a reasonable basis in
law and should therefore not be disturbed by the courts.13 9 This
was exactly the reasoning employed by Justice Brennan with re-
spect to his application of the "labor nexus" standard to "confi-
dential" status in Hendricks County.1 40 By adopting similar ap-
proaches in defending the Board's application of that standard in
138. 416 U.S. at 309 (citing North Arkansas Electric Coop., 185 N.L.R.B. 550 (1970)).
Justice White's contention on this point is well-founded. In North Arkansas Electric Coop.,
the Board held that an "electrification advisor" who often spoke for management in cus-
tomer relations matters, but who did not participate in the formulation, determination, or
effectuation of policy with respect to employee relations matters, was an "employee" under
the Act. The Board drew a very precise distinction between the exclusion of such employees
from collective bargaining in toto and their exclusion from specific bargaining units:
[T]he "managerial employee" category is Board-created, not established by the Act.
In our representation case proceedings, individuals found to fall within that category
have been consistently excluded by the Board from bargaining units of other types of
employees. But typically in those cases, our concern has been whether certain nonsu-
pervisory employees have a sufficient community of interest with the general group or
class of employees constituting the bulk of a unit so that they may appropriately be
considered a part thereof. Where the interests of certain employees seem to lie more
with those persons who formulate, determine, and oversee company policy than with
those in the proposed unit who merely carry out the resultant policy, we have held
them to be excluded, and have commonly referred to such excluded persons as "man-
agerial employees," without ever having attempted a precise definition of that term.
Our lack of clear definition has evoked some judicial criticism ...
This lack of definition may be inherent in the difficult process which we face con-
stantly in evaluating "community of interest" in many kinds of unit determinations.
Since, however, in representation cases "community of interest" is the principal de-
terminant, our decisions in those cases are not genuinely relevant to the issue here.
An employee may not have the requisite community of interest with other employees
to be included with them in a proposed unit, and yet clearly be an employee entitled
to the protection of the Act as a Section 2(3) "employee." On the other hand, some
persons we have traditionally excluded as "managerial" might more accurately have
been termed "employers" within the definition of Section 2(2), which defines employ-
ers as including "any persons acting as an agent of an employer."
In this case, we have been called upon to determine whether a given individual is to
be considered as a Section 2(3) "employee" or a Section 2(2) "employer." As we have
explained above, the fact that he may be a "managerial employee" for purposes of
determining his exclusion from a given bargaining unit may well not assist us materi-
ally in making this kind of determination.
We do not in this initial consideration wish to attempt an inflexible comprehensive
definition, for we are of the view that a definition must be evolved on a case-to-case
basis. However, it is relevant, we believe, to focus our attention upon whether the
employee here had either real or apparent authority to speak as an "employer" in a
labor relations or employee relations context.
185 N.L.R.B. 550 (1970) (footnotes omitted). Enforcement was denied by the Eighth Circuit.
See supra note 120.
139. 416 U.S. at 311 (White, J., dissenting).
140. See supra notes 1-10 and accompanying text.
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both instances, Justices White and Brennan failed to discern the
very substantial differences between the "confidential" and "mana-
gerial" groups and did not consider whether better law-and bet-
ter labor relations policy-might have resulted had they applied
different standards to each of these groups. This, of course, is the
mirror image of the very same shortcoming presented in Justice
Powell's opposition to the application of the "labor nexus" stan-
dard to both of these groups of employees.
The difficulty in adopting a uniform approach to both "confiden-
tial" and "managerial" classifications lies in the divergent develop-
ment of the law respecting the status of "managerial" employees
and the status of "confidential" employees. This distinction, in
turn, rests upon the fact that these two categories represent groups
of employees whose authority and interests are very different. As
already discussed, the Board took an extremely firm and consistent
stance on the scope of the "confidential" category almost from the
first instance, and has consistently maintained that stance to the
present day. Furthermore, neither the Board nor the courts have
ever seen any need to raise the possibility of "confidential" em-
ployees organizing into separate units; those employees were either
included within rank-and-file bargaining units or excluded from
collective bargaining altogether. In contrast, the Board and the
courts rather consistently assumed that employees who were highly
placed within the managerial-executive "hierarchy" were excluded
from the coverage of the Act as a matter of policy, if not by stat-
ute, 4' while exhibiting a marked inconsistency towards defining
the scope of this "managerial" category. This vacillation was par-
ticularly pronounced during the pre-Taft-Hartley period (parallel-
ing a similar tendency during this period with respect to the collec-
tive bargaining rights of supervisors). 42 In the following years, the
141. International Ladies' Garment Workers' Union v. NLRB, 339 F.2d 116 (2d Cir.
1964); Palace Laundry Dry Cleaning Corp., 75 N.L.R.B. 320 (1947).
142. 416 U.S. at 277. At first, the Board excluded supervisors from rank-and-file bar-
gaining units. See, e.g., Mueller Brass Co., 39 N.L.R.B. 167 (1942); Ingalls Iron Works Co.,
29 N.L.R.B. 156 (1941); Richardson Co., 4 N.L.R.B. 835 (1938); Ontario Knife Co., 4
N.L.R.B. 29 (1937). The Board then reversed course, defined supervisors to be "employees,"
and permitted them to organize into separate bargaining units. Godchaux Sugars, Inc., 44
N.L.R.B. 874 (1942); Union Collieries Coal Co., 41 N.L.R.B. 961 (1942), supplemental deci-
sion, 44 N.L.R.B. 165 (1942). Furthermore, the Board permitted supervisors to belong to
bargaining units if consistent with bargaining history, see, e.g., Curtiss-Wright Corp., 33
N.L.R.B. 490 (1941); American Oak Leather Co., 32 N.L.R.B. 247 (1941); Certain-Teed
Prods. Corp., 28 N.L.R.B. 915 (1941); Gulf Public Serv. Co., 18 N.L.R.B. 562 (1939), or if
their supervisory authority was found to be "minor." Union Collieries' Coal Co., 41 N.L.R.B.
961 (1942); Alabama Dry Dock & Shipbuilding Co., 39 N.L.R.B. 954 (1942); Consolidated
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scope of the "managerial" category became better defined and, al-
most invariably, that category did not include a "labor nexus."
The Board clearly intended to exclude a category of employees
from rank-and-file units solely on the basis of their close relation-
ship to management rather than on specific job responsibilities or
access to particular kinds of information relating to labor relations.
For example, in Freiz & Sons, 14  the Board excluded expediters
from a rank-and-file bargaining unit because the employees' tasks
in expediting completion of orders, assuring adherence to produc-
tion time schedules, and monitoring work until final completion
and shipment evidenced their close relationship with
management. "
In Burke Brewery, Inc.,1" the Board excluded from a bargaining
unit an employee who held general responsibility for corporate
records and occupied the combined positions of office manager,
head bookkeeper and secretary to the company president. The
Board determined that this employee's interests and functions
Steel Corp., 26 N.L.R.B. 44 (1940); Hummer Mfg. Co., 26 N.L.R.B. 27 (1940); Western Rub-
ber Co., 17 N.L.R.B. 426 (1939); Bethlehem Shipbuilding Corp., 11 N.L.R.B. 105 (1939);
Willys Overland Motors, Inc., 9 N.L.R.B. 924, supplemental decision, 10 N.L.R.B. 160
(1938). However, in Maryland Dry Dock Co., 49 N.L.R.B. 733 (1943), the Board ruled that
supervisors could not constitute an appropriate bargaining unit or be included in other bar-
gaining units, a theory which was followed for three years. See, e.g., Beckwith Mach. Co., 60
N.L.R.B. 521 (1945); Seattle Drum Co., 60 N.L.R.B. 440 (1945); J.C. Blair Co., 59 N.L.R.B.
1518 (1945). Some exceptions were made for "minor" supervisors who spent considerable
time doing production work. See, e.g., Maui Pineapple Co., 60 N.L.R.B. 401 (1945); Piggly
Wiggly of San Diego, Inc., 60 N.L.R.B. 47 (1945); Gulf Refining Co., 59 N.L.R.B. 1483
(1945); Remington-Rand Inc., 56 N.L.R.B. 251 (1944); Land O'Lakes Creameries, Inc., 53
N.L.R.B. 910 (1943); Byron Jackson Co., 53 N.L.R.B. 528 (1943); Seymour Woolen Mills, 53
N.L.R.B. 321 (1943). The Board reversed its position once again in Packard Motor Car Co.,
61 N.L.R.B. 4 (1945) in which it held that foremen could constitute a separate appropriate
unit for collective bargaining. This result was, as already noted, affirmed by a five to four
Supreme Court decision and was, in turn, negated by the revisions to section 2(3) and the
addition of section 2(11) of the Taft-Hartley Act. See also supra note 57.
143. 47 N.L.R.B. 43 (1943).
144. Id. at 47. This result contrasts with the Board's treatment of time-study employ-
ees. Such employees have generally, although not invariably, been included within bargain-
ing units as against challenges that they are either "confidential," see, e.g., Hampton Roads
Maritime Ass'n, 178 N.L.R.B. 263 (1969); Chicago Pneumatic Tool Co., 81 N.L.R.B. 584
(1949); Brown & Sharpe Mfg. Co., 68 N.L.R.B. 487 (1946), or "managerial," see, e.g., Yale &
Towne Mfg. Co., 135 N.L.R.B. 926 (1962); General Elec. Co., 89 N.L.R.B. 726 (1950); Bull-
dog Elec. Prods. Co., 22 N.L.R.B. 104 (1940). But see Yale & Towne Mfg. Co., 60 N.L.R.B.
626 (1945) including such employees on the theory that they merely compile information
that may be used by other employees to improve production efficiency. However, employees
who actually oversee the production process have been excluded from rank-and-file bargain-
ing units as "managerial." See, e.g., Dura Steel Prods. Co., 109 N.L.R.B. 179 (1954); Dortch
Stove Works, Inc., 79 N.L.R.B. 1258 (1948); Spicer Mfg. Corp., 55 N.L.R.B. 1491 (1944).
145. 54 N.L.R.B. 1061 (1944).
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were more closely allied to those of management than they were to
those of bargaining unit employees, although he did not act in any
supervisory capacity or play any role in or possess confidential
knowledge of his employer's labor relations.'46
In J.L. Brandeis & Sons, Inc.,147 the Board excluded from a bar-
gaining unit of sales clerks an assistant in a department store's
merchandise department who possessed no supervisory functions.
The Board stated that in the performance of his duties, the assis-
tant was carrying out management functions and was associated
almost entirely with other management representatives. 148 Several
other cases involved buyers, whom the Board tended to exclude on
the grounds that they possessed the authority to commit their em-
ployers' funds.1
49
However, it was not until its decision in Ford Motor Co."--the
very same decision that firmly established the "labor nexus" test
for determining "confidential" status-that the Board first enunci-
ated any sort of uniform standard for determining "managerial"
status, or indeed any theory underlying the existence of that cate-
gory. The Board stated that, "[W]e have customarily excluded
from bargaining units of rank-and-file workers executive employees
who are in a position to formulate, determine, and effectuate man-
agement policies. These employees we have considered and still
deem to be 'managerial' in that they express and make operative
the decisions of management.'
151
The Board then ruled the "labor nexus" test was applicable to
"confidential" employees,1 5 2 drawing a sharp distinction between
that category and the "managerial" category to which no "labor
nexus" requirement applied. 183 It also drew an even more crucial
distinction- "managerial" employees were "executives" who "for-
mulate, determine and effectuate management policies"-clearly, a
powerful group whose exclusion from collective bargaining was pre-
146. Id. at 1062.
147. 54 N.L.R.B. 880 (1944).
148. Id. at 885.
149. Most of these instances concerned the exclusion of buyers from office/clerical bar-
gaining units. See, e.g., Electric Controller & Mfg. Co., 69 N.L.R.B. 1242 (1946); Barrett
Div., Allied Chem. & Dye Corp., 65 N.L.R.B. 903 (1946); Aluminum Co. of Am., 61 N.L.R.B.
1066 (1945) (senior account clerks and aides to the credit manager with "power to make
financial commitments on behalf of his employer" excluded); Inland Steel Container Co., 56
N.L.R.B. 138 (1944); Hudson Motor Car Co., 55 N.L.R.B. 509 (1944).
150. 66 N.L.R.B. 1317 (1946). See supra note 2.
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mised upon their proximity to the top of the corporate hierarchy
and their authority over corporate decision-making and opera-
tional strategy. "Confidential" employees, on the other hand, were
relatively low-level employees far from the center of corporate
power, whose exclusion from collective bargaining was to be pre-
mised upon access to information or providing assistance to a spe-
cific subset of "managerial" employees-those operating in the la-
bor relations area. The Board has generally continued to maintain
these crucial distinctions between the two categories, and all of its
decisions excluding employees from collective bargaining on the
basis of their general "alignment with management" have involved
"managerial" employees who exercised at least some degree of cor-
porate decision-making authority, independent of established
policy.
In Palace Laundry Dry Cleaning Corp.,'" the Board refused to
exclude store managers from a bargaining unit stating:
The determination of "managerial," like the determination of "supervi-
sory" is to some extend necessarily a matter of the degree of authority exer-
cised. We have in the past, and before the passage of the recent amend-
ments to the Act, recognized and defined as "managerial" employees,
executives who formulate and effectuate management policies by expressing
and making operative the decisions of their employer, and have excluded
such managerial employees from bargaining units.. . . We believe that the
Act, as amended, contemplates the continuance of this practice. 156
The Board in A.S. Abell Co.' 56 refused to exclude editorial and
news department employees on the grounds that those employees
were bound to follow their employer's "body of doctrine" and did
not set that "doctrine.' 57 In this case the Board clearly enunciated
the view that a managerial employee's duties in formulation and
determination of management policy necessarily indicates a signifi-
cant degree of decision-making authority.1
5 8
Parts managers were included in a bargaining unit of parts de-
partment employees over the employer's objection in Kitsap
County Automobile Dealers Ass'n.15 Although the employer ar-
gued that their functions in making minor purchases on his behalf
and setting prices and discounts from auto parts in accordance
154. 75 N.L.R.B. 320 (1947).
155. Id. at 323 n.4.
156. 81 N.L.R.B. 82 (1949).
157. Id. at 84.
158. Id. at 83-84. See also, Suburban Newspaper Pubs., Inc. 226 N.L.R.B. 154 (1976);
Bulletin Co., 226 N.L.R.B. 345 (1976).
159. 124 N.L.R.B. 933 (1959).
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with "price books" conferred "managerial" status upon these parts
managers, the court reasoned that:
The fact that an employee may make purchases on behalf of, or otherwise
commit the credit of, his employer does not in all circumstances, conclu-
sively confer managerial status upon such employee. . . . Furthermore, the
fact, as here, that employees exercise some discretion in carrying out their
responsibilities and do not work under close immediate supervision, likewise
does not compel a finding that the employees are managerial. The determi-
nation of an employee's "managerial" status depends upon the extent of the
exercise of his discretion. The routine performance by an employee of
largely predetermined policies does not warrant finding him to be manage-
rial. . . . However, in the instant case, the authority of the parts depart-
ment employees to "formulate and effectuate" policy is, as noted above,
limited generally by company policy and trade customs, which they do not
determine.6 0
In Brotherhood of Locomotive Firemen & Enginemen1 6' the
Board included in a bargaining unit of office employees a "promo-
tion director" who coordinated the employer's membership drives
and insurance sales programs and an assistant chief clerk who
spent his time answering correspondence and adjusting internal
disputes on the grounds that their functions were firmly estab-
lished within the bounds of established policy rather than as a
matter of the free exercise of their own discretion. The Board's
comment respecting the "promotion director" is instructive:
A managerial employee must formulate, determine, and effectuate an em-
ployer's policies, but as indicated above, the promotion director clearly
functions within the well-defined limits of the Employer's predetermined
policy. The Board has long held that an occasional policy recommendation
which an employee may make is not enough to create managerial status. 6s
Three recent Board decisions involving employees of television
stations further demonstrate the Board's policy to limit the "man-
160. Id. at 934.
161. 145 N.L.R.B. 1521 (1964).
162. Id. at 1527-28, citing Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 122 N.L.R.B. 391 (1958) and
AFL/CIO, 120 N.L.R.B. 969 (1958). See also Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 138 N.L.R.B. 778
(1962) (senior internal auditor who merely analyzed operations established pursuant to pre-
existing management policies included in unit); Yale & Towne Mfg. Co., 135 N.L.R.B. 926
(1962) (standards engineers and data analysts who set job standards and applied them in
potential grievance situations included in unit); Iowa Indus. Hydraulics, Inc., 169 N.L.R.B.
205 (1968) (sales engineers whose job in designing and selling hydraulic cylinders required
considerable technical and professional skill not "managerial" where their authority in for-
mulation and effectuation of management policies was strictly limited); Westinghouse Elec.
Corp., 163 N.L.R.B. 723 (1967), enforced, 424 F.2d 1151 (7th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 400
U.S. 831 (1970) (lead and assistant engineers held to be "professional" rather than "manage-
rial" employees).
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agerial" category to employees who participate in actual poli-
cymaking. In Westinghouse Broadcasting Co. (WBZ-TV),' 6 the
Board determined that producer-directors were not "managerial"
employees in spite of their highly responsible positions with the
station. Finding their involvement in station management policies
or financial affairs subject to the strict control and advance ap-
proval of the station's managers, the Board concluded these em-
ployees were not "managerial" because their discretion in execut-
ing their assignments could not exceed the bounds of policy
determined by others.'" In Golden West Broadcasters-KTLA,1 5
the Board reached the same conclusion with respect to a station's
"directors" (department heads). While the Board acknowledged
the considerable discretion enjoyed by these employees with re-
spect to matters of artistic judgment, it nevertheless ruled their
subordination to station management policy set by others pre-
cluded their exclusion from a bargaining unit based upon alleged
"managerial" status.16" Finally, in Post-Newsweek Stations of
Florida, Inc.167 the Board again denied "managerial" status to pro-
ducer-directors on similar grounds.168
In Simplex Industries, Inc.,1 ' the Board summarized the post-
Bell Aerospace determinant of "managerial" status as follows:
The Supreme Court and the Board, in determining managerial status,
weigh the facts elicited to determine whether or not the persons at issue are
involved in the formulation, determination, and effectuation of management
policies by expressing and making operative the decisions of their employer,
and whether they have discretion in the performance of their job duties in-
dependent of their employer's established policies.
70
163. 215 N.L.R.B. 123 (1974).
164. Id. at 125.
165. 215 N.L.R.B. 760 (1974).
166. Id. at 762.
167. 217 N.L.R.B. 14 (1975).
168. Id., concluding that:
[Ilt does not appear that a producer/director could initiate a major policy or pro-
gramming change, nor authorize the expenditure of new funds, without prior ap-
proval. His range of discretion is limited in all significant respects by station policy,
external regulations, current production practices, and the necessity of obtaining ap-
proval, prior to initiation and substantial alteration in the station's programming.
Id.
169. 243 N.L.R.B. 111 (1979).
170. Id. In Simplex, the Board found a credit manager who established and reviewed
lines of credit for corporate customers, a buyer who was primarily responsible for the com-
pany's raw materials purchases and a transportation manager who was responsible for all of
the company's receipt and distribution of incoming raw materials and outgoing finished
products to be "managerial." See also Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 236 N.L.R.B. 1290 (1978)
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In addition to those employees who helped formulate managerial
policy or operated with virtually unfettered discretion outside the
constraints of policies established by others, the Board continued
to confer "managerial" status upon buyers and other employees
who possessed the effective authority to commit the employer
financially, apparently on the belief that this authority "allied
them with management. 1 7' This, of course, is not at odds with the
limitation of managerial status to those employees placed at a high
rank within the corporate hierarchy.
Prior to the North Arkansas Electric and Bell Aerospace deci-
sions, the courts rarely addressed the question of the "managerial"
employee, and, while particular determinations of the Board may
have been criticized, the operative legal standard for "managerial"
status was not challenged. Thus, in NLRB v. Swift & Co., 172 the
First Circuit sustained a determination including a stenographer in
an office/clerical bargaining unit, rejecting the contention that she
was "confidential" or "managerial." The Board declared that she
"has nothing to do with formulating or determining company pol-
(the ability to exercise "wide discretion" is a requisite of "managerial" status); General Dy-
namics Corp., 213 N.L.R.B. 851 (1974).
171. See, e.g., Simplex Indus., Inc., 243 N.L.R.B. 111 (1979); Hunt & Mottet Co., 206
N.L.R.B. 285 (1973); Ed's Foodland of Springfield, Inc., 159 N.L.R.B. 1256 (1966); Brother-
hood of Locomotive Firemen & Enginemen, 145 N.L.R.B. 1521 (1964); Albuquerque Div.,
ACF Indus., Inc., 145 N.L.R.B. 403 (1963); Overton Markets, 142 N.L.R.B. 615 (1963); East-
ern Camera & Photo Corp., 140 N.L.R.B. 569 (1963); Root Dry Goods Co., 126 N.L.R.B. 953
(1960); Weaver Motors, 123 N.L.R.B. 209 (1959); Interstate Co., 125 N.L.R.B. 101 (1959);
W.W. Chambers Co., 124 N.L.R.B. 984 (1959); Federal Telephone & Radio Co., 120
N.L.R.B. 1652 (1958); Kearney & Trecker Corp., 121 N.L.R.B. 817 (1958); Temco Aircraft
Corp., 121 N.L.R.B. 1085 (1958); Plankinton Packing Co., 116 N.L.R.B. 1225 (1956); Cur-
tiss-Wright Corp., 103 N.L.R.B. 458 (1953); Titeflex, Inc., 103 N.L.R.B. 223 (1953); Bulldog
Elec. Prods., Co., 96 N.L.B. 642 (1951); Denton's Inc., Robinson-Schwenn Store, 83 N.L.R.B.
35 (1948). However, certain buyers have been denied "managerial" status and included
within bargaining units where their discretion in setting prices or pledging their employers'
credit was strictly prescribed by management. Dynaselectron Corp., 231 N.L.R.B. 1147
(1977); Highview, Inc., 223 N.L.R.B. 646 (1976); Lockheed Aircraft Corp., Lockheed-Califor-
nia Co. Div., 217 N.L.R.B. 573 (1975); Aeronca, Inc., 221 N.L.R.B. 326 (1975); General Dy-
namics Corp., 213 N.L.R.B. 851 (1974); Fairfax Family Fund, Inc., 195 N.L.R.B. 306 (1972);
Eastern Camera & Photo Corp., 140 N.L.R.B. 569 (1963); Barr's Jewelers, 131 N.L.R.B. 235
(1961); Diana Shop Spokane, Inc., 118 N.L.R.B. 743 (1957); Mack Trucks, Inc., 116 N.L.R.B.
1576 (1956); Vulcanized Rubber & Plastics Co., 129 N.L.R.B. 1256 (1956); Farmers Union
Livestock Ass'n, 116 N.L.R.B. 1069 (1956): Eljer Co., 108 N.L.R.B. 1417 (1954); General
Elec. Co., 89 N.L.R.B. 726 (1950). Compare, Brookings Plywood Corp., 98 N.L.R.B. 794
(1952), vacated on other grounds, 100 N.L.R.B. 431 (Supplemental Decision and Order
(1952)), in which the Board held that an employee's ownership of corporate stock in the
employer did not preclude his inclusion in a collective bargaining unit absent independent
evidence of that employee's "true managerial" status.
172. 292 F.2d 561 (1st Cir. 1961), enforcing 128 N.L.R.B. 347 (1960).
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icy or managing, to any great extent certainly, the work of others.
Nor does she have access to confidential information with respect
to labor matters.
17 3
In International Ladies Garment Workers' Union v. NLRB,
1 7
4
the Second Circuit upheld the Board's ruling that union business
agents were not "managerial" employees, stating that "while the
task of a business agent is one that requires considerable skill and
judgment, the Board was clearly warranted in finding that they are
more concerned with the day-to-day routine of industrial organiza-
tion, following policy rather than establishing it."'17 5 The Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia in Retail Clerks Interna-
tional Ass'n v. NLRB1 6 criticized the Board for "not having devel-
oped clear standards for determining what is a managerial em-
ployee," but it upheld the Board's determination in a similar
situation. It held that the union's business representatives did not
perform work that would necessarily involve them in conflicts of
173. 292 F.2d at 564.
174. 339 F.2d 116 (2d Cir. 1964), enforcing 131 N.L.R.B. 111 (1961).
175. 339 F.2d at 123, citing AFL, 120 N.L.R.B. 969 (1968).
176. 366 F.2d 642 (D.C. Cir. 1966). This case is interesting because of the court's find-
ing that a "two-strand" test of "managerial" status had been applied by the Board:
The Board has not developed clear standards for determining what is a managerial
employee; there seem, however, to be two tests. The first is whether, even if they do
not supervise other workers, their position with the employer presents a potential
conflict of interest between the employer and the workers, e.g., employment inter-
viewers who have authority in hiring.... This strand of the managerial employee
test is often phrased in a more conclusory manner, i.e., that the employee is closely
related to or aligned with the management; such a determination, however, also
seems to turn on the possibility of a conflict of interest arising, e.g., timekeepers and
expediters, Bendix Aviation Corp., 47 N.L.R.B. 43 (1943); an office manager and re-
cord keeper who has no confidential information about other employees, Burke Brew-
ery, Inc., 54 N.L.R.B. 1061 (1944).
The Board also excludes from the protection of the Act, as managerial employees,
"those who formulate, determine, and effectuate an employer's policies," . . . and
those who have discretion in the performance of their jobs, but not if the discretion
must conform to an employer's established policy, Eastern Camera and Photo Corp.,
140 N.L.R.B. 569, 571 (1963) (store managers who could set prices are not manage-
rial). The rationale for this Board policy, though unarticulated, seems to be the rea-
sonable belief that Congress intended to exclude from the protection of the Act those
who comprised a part of "management" or were allied with it on the theory that they
were the one from whom the workers needed protection.
366 F.2d at 644-45.
The "conflict of interest" test had been mentioned by the Board in very few cases. See,
e.g., New England Tel. & Tel Co., 90 N.L.R.B. 639 (1950). However, it never achieved true
recognition until the Board attempted to impose it as an additional requirement for "mana-
gerial" status apart from the established requirement that such employees formulate, deter-
mine, and effectuate policy. This additional requirement, of course, later became a focus of
controversy in both North Arkansas Electric Cooperative, Inc., and Bell Aerospace.
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interest between themselves as union members and their employ-
ment as union representatives, and that they were not policy-mak-
ing officials of the International Union.177 In Illinois State Jour-
nal-Register v. NLRB,17 8 the Seventh Circuit, while again
criticizing the Board for lack of clarity as to the applicable "mana-
gerial" standard, held that the employer's district circulation man-
agers were "employees" within the meaning of the Act and not
"managerial. 1 79 It noted both the absence of similar potential con-
flicts and that:
While the district man has various responsibilities, they are minor in na-
ture and not tantamount to those of an employee who formulates, deter-
mines, and effectuates his employer's policies. The scope of his authority in
the area of significant management policy is limited in nature and as the
Regional Director aptly notes, "the discretion and initiative which these
man [sic] are expected to exercise fall within relatively unimportant areas."
The record contains evidence indicating that in the few areas where the dis-
trict man appears to have some discretion in the performance of his job and
to have some semblance of policy authority the Company effectively circum-
scribes such discretion and limits such authority. 80
The court further held that the power to make recommendations
does not warrant precluding one from representation as a manage-
rial employee. 181
In Continental Insurance Co. v. NLRB, 182 the Second Circuit
held that insurance adjusters who were involved in managerial
177. 366 F.2d at 645.
178. 412 F.2d 37 (7th Cir. 1969), enforcing 171 N.L.R.B. 130 (1968).
179. 412 F.2d at 44. The court in Illinois State Journal-Register, Inc., followed the
same "two-strand" approach used in Retail Clerks (supra n.175) and further confirmed that
the "conflict of interest" test for "managerial" status was, indeed, a "labor nexus" standard,
i.e., that for such a conflict of interest to arise, an allegedly "managerial" employee must be
involved in his or her employer's labor policies to an extent necessary to suggest the likeli-
hood of the existence of such a potential conflict. 412 F.2d at 41-42. Neither Justice Powell
nor Justice White made mention of this aspect of the decision in the Bell Aerospace opin-
ions, even though it would appear to have been directly overruled by Justice Powell's opin-
ion. Neither Illinois State Journal-Register, Inc., nor Retail Clerks, clarified whether the
two "strands" were to be viewed as alternative tests for "managerial" status, or whether
they were to be viewed in conjunction with one another. Later, in North Arkansas Electric
Cooperative and Bell Aerospace, the Board chose the approach of viewing both "strands" as
prerequisites for "managerial" status, an approach never used by the courts.
180. 412 F.2d at 42. The court noted in this connection top management's ultimate
authority (and ability to overrule the decisions of district circulation manager) on: (a) initi-
ating discount policies; (b) initiation and design of circulation campaigns; (c) subdivision of
circulation districts; (d) establishing delivery routes; (e) pledging the employer's credit; and
(f) retention and termination of newscarriers.
181. Id. at 42-43.
182. 409 F.2d 727 (2d Cir. 1969), enforcing 172 N.L.R.B. 406 (1968).
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policymaking were not "managerial" employees despite their abil-
ity to pledge their employer's credit in amounts up to $2,500. And,
in Westinghouse Electric Corp. v. NLRB, 183 the Seventh Circuit
enforced a Board ruling that field engineers who were mostly
mechanical engineers sent by the employer to various customers'
jobsites to provide technical advice and instruction on the installa-
tion and use of its products were "professional employees" rather
than "supervisors" or "managerial" employees.184
The most strongly contested question of "managerial" status
that has arisen in the post-Bell Aerospace period is the issue of
whether college and university faculty operating under a "shared-
governance" system could be excluded from collective bargaining
as "managerial." Neither the Board nor the courts have retreated
from the position that policymaking authority is a necessary pre-
requisite for such status.185 The issue focuses on whether or not the
authority granted to faculty to determine the institution's educa-
tional and administrative policy with respect to matters such as
curricula, admissions and hiring is sufficient to invest them with
"managerial" status. The basic approach to this issue by the courts
has been a case-by-case examination of the authority of faculty in
each particular institutional setting.1 8s
183. 424 F.2d 1151 (7th Cir. 1970), enforcing 171 N.L.R.B. 1239 (1968). The court
employed the "two-strand" test originally set forth in Retail Clerks, supra n.176, in a con-
junctive sense and found that these employees did not satisfy either "strand."
184. 424 F.2d at 1155. The court stated that:
While the engineers here exercise a certain amount of independent judgment, it is
district or area managers who effectively set and carry out management policy. Only
minor on-the-job changes from the original plans are permitted without approval
from headquarters. The lead engineers' authority to pledge the company's credit is
limited to relatively small and routine purchases. We find substantial evidence on the
record as a whole to support the Board's finding that the responsibilities of the engi-
neers are not managerial.
Id. at 1158.
185. See, e.g., Ithaca College, 244 N.L.R.B. 517 (1979), vacated, 623 F.2d 224 (2d Cir.
1980) on the basis of NLRB v. Yeshiva Univ., infra n.188; Philander Smith College, 246
N.L.R.B. 499 (1979); New York Univ., 221 N.L.R.B. 1148 (1975); Fairleigh Dickinson Univ.,
227 N.L.R.B. 239 (1976); Northeastern Univ., 218 N.L.R.B. 247 (1975); Wentworth Inst., 210
N.L.R.B. 345 (1974), enforced sub nom., NLRB v. Wentworth, 515 F.2d 550 (1st Cir. 1975);
University of Miami, 213 N.L.R.B. 634 (1974); Fordham Univ., 214 N.L.R.B. 971 (1974);
New York Univ., 205 N.L.R.B. 4 (1973); Adelphi Univ., 195 N.L.R.B. 639 (1972); C.W. Post
Center, 189 N.L.R.B. 904 (1971); Fordham Univ., 193 N.L.R.B. 134 (1971).
186. This approach was best summarized by the First Circuit in NLRB v. Wentworth,
515 F.2d at 556-57:
Wentworth contends that the Act should not be read to include college faculty
among the ranks of workers in the industrial world who are "employees" under the
Act. An educational institution's goals of teaching and advancing knowledge are said
to be so closely dependent upon each faculty member that the trustees and adminis-
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In NLRB v. Yeshiva University, s" a divided United States
Supreme Court overruled the use of this approach and termed the
entire full-time faculty of the university "managerial" rather than
"professional." However, it did so based upon what it perceived to
be the unconventional structure of authority in a "mature" private
university as opposed to that more generally prevailing in an in-
dustrial setting.188 Its decision was based upon factors unique to
the university setting and more specifically the power exercised by
tration, who have ultimate authority, as a matter of course delegate to the faculty or
its representatives varying amounts of authority and influence over educational policy
and the government of the institution. This relationship is said to stand in contrast to
the normal adversarial positions of employees and a monolithic management, and is
illustrated by the rarity of faculty strikes which might disrupt commerce. Collective
bargaining by an exclusive faculty bargaining agent under the rules of the Act will
supposedly result in the erosion of academic freedom and meritocratic value, and in
the substitution of adversarial attitudes for traditional collegiality and shared
responsibility.
We do not take Wentworth's views lightly, and were we a legislature, we might read
a different result. But we are unable to -convince ourselves that all faculties of all
private nonprofit institutions of higher learning in the nation are so situated as to fall
outside the ranks of "employees" under the Act. Given wide differences in terms of
service and responsibility, the focus must be upon each particular institution.
The court then concluded that under facts as given, the Wentworth Institute faculty was
not "managerial":
On the record in this case, the Board was entitled to find that neither the
Wentworth faculty nor its committees possess substantive authority. The structure is
hierarchical, and there is no evidence of an instance of significant faculty impact col-
lectively or individually on policy or managerial matters other than the scheduling of
exams, classes, and other such routine matters. The two individuals included in the
unit who come closest to satisfying the definition of managerial employees would be
the two faculty members at the College who spent part time assisting with planning.
However, there is insufficient evidence indicating responsibility on their part over
matters of substance to compel a finding that they are managerial employees.
Id. at 557. Prior to 1980, the Board almost invariably took the position that university
faculty were "professional employees" under section 2(12) of the Act and were not "manage-
rial" on the grounds that their institutional authority was "collegial and advisory" only and
not exercised on behalf of the employer. It also took the position that final authority for
decision making in a university setting rested with boards of trustees. See New York Uni-
versity, 221 N.L.R.B. at 1149.
187. 444 U.S. 672 (1980). The lineup in Yeshiva was consistent with that of Bell Aero-
space and Hendricks County: Justice Powell favored a broad reading of the "managerial"
exclusion and Justice Brennan, in dissent, advanced a narrow constuction of the exclusion.
The Board had directed an election within a bargaining unit comprised of all full-time
faculty of the university, 221 N.L.R.B. 1053 (1975), and had issued a bargaining order upon
the University's refusal to bargain with the union certified as the faculty's bargaining repre-
sentative as a result of the election. 231 N.L.R.B. 597 (1977). However, the Second Circuit
denied enforcement of that order because of what it perceived to be the faculty's "manage-
rial" status. 582 F.2d 686 (2d Cir. 1978).
188. 444 U.S. at 680.
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faculty in an environment of collegial decision-making. 189 The
Court did not alter in any manner the scope of the "managerial"
exclusion as developed and its restriction to those employees pos-
sessing a share of power to direct the employer's enterprise. In-
stead, it sought merely to apply that exclusion to a rather sensitive
situation involving elements of both policymaking authority and
professional status. The Court clearly did not intend its Yeshiva
decision to portend a broadening of the generally applied "mana-
gerial" exclusion as established in Bell Aerospace or even as that
decision was applied to professional employees or universities as a
group.1
90
189. The following excerpts from Justice Powell's decision emphasize the extent to
which such factors were relied upon by the court:
The controlling consideration in this case is that the faculty of Yeshiva University
exercise authority which in any other context unquestionably would be managerial.
Their authority in academic matters is absolute. They decide what courses will be
offered, when they will be scheduled, and to whom they will be taught. They debate
and determine teaching methods, grading policies, and matriculation standards. They
effectively decide which students will be admitted, retained, and graduated. On occa-
sion their views have determined the size of the student body, the tuition to be
charged, and the location of a school. When one considers the function of a univer-
sity, it is difficult to imagine decisions more managerial than these. To the extent the
industrial analogy applies, the faculty determines within each school the product to
be produced, the terms upon which it will be offered, and the customers who will be
served.
444 U.S. at 686.
190. Id. at 689-90. The Court stated:
We certainly are not suggesting an application of the managerial exclusion that
would sweep all professionals outside the Act in derogation of Congress' expressed
intent to protect them. The Board has recognized that employees whose decisionmak-
ing is limited to the routine discharge of professional duties in projects to which they
have been assigned cannot be excluded from coverage even if union membership ar-
guably may involve some divided loyalty. Only if an employee's activities fall outside
the scope of the duties routinely performed by similarly situated professionals will he
be found aligned with management. We think these decisions accurately capture the
intent of Congress, and that they provide an appropriate starting point for analysis in
cases involving professionals alleged to be managerials.
Id. at 690. The subject of the labor relations status of academicians in general and of the
effect of the Yeshiva University decision has generated considerable commentary. See, e.g.,
'Menard and Morrill, Are Faculty Members Scholars or Managers?-The Yeshiva Case, 30
LABOR LAW J. 754 (1979); Bethel, Private University Professors and NLRB v. Yeshiva: The
Second Circuit's Misconception of Shared Authority and Supervisory Status, 44 Mo. L.
REv. 427 (1979); Jascourt, NLRB v. Yeshiva University: An Introduction, 9 J. oF LAW AND
EDUC. 463 (1980); Osborne, The Need for Legislation After Yeshiva, 9 J. OF LAW AND EDUC.
465 (1980); Grenig, The Implications of NLRB v. Yeshiva University, 9 J. OF LAW & EDUC.
479 (1980); Note, NLRB v. Yeshiva University: The Demise of Academic Collective Bar-
gaining?, 32 MERCER L. REv. 907 (1981); Note, NLRB v. Yeshiva University: The Profes-
sional-Managerial Overlap, 32 HASTINGS L.J. 659 (1981).
Duquesne Law Review
B. "Confidential" and "Managerial" Status Contrasted
Given this history of the "managerial" exclusion, the stark dis-
tinction between the evolution and purpose of that exclusion and
that of the "confidential" employee exclusion becomes readily ap-
parent. The Board adopted a clear, firm stance on what "confiden-
tial" status entailed, and maintained that stance consistently. The
standard adopted was easy to apply, since most employees who
play any significant role in the labor relations area can be readily
identified. Its approach was backed by the courts of appeals, with
the exception of three cases, 9' which called for a departure from
the established analysis in favor of a broader definition of "confi-
dential" status. In Hendricks County, the Supreme Court rejected
this broader view of "confidential" status in favor of the Board's
established and stricter "labor nexus" approach.
The situation confronting the Supreme Court in Bell Aerospace
was almost exactly the opposite. The application of a standard for
determining "managerial" status has been anything but clear and
definitive, due to the difficulty inherent in making any objective
assessment as to which employees within an executive hierarchy
really play a significant role in the "formulation, determination,
and effectuation of management policy." This is particularly true
with respect to professional or highly-skilled technical personnel.
Most often, the only way to make such a determination has been
to consider whether or not the disputed and allegedly "manage-
rial" employees possessed a community of interest with the re-
mainder of the bargaining unit, a task which even the Board has
admitted is very difficult. 9 ' Yet, the Board has applied at least two
consistent elements in all "managerial" determinations: (1) the
power to shape or, at the very least, to influence management pol-
icy (or, alternatively, to act on behalf of the employer); or (2) the
power to commit the employer's financial resources at his or her
discretion, independent of fixed guidelines or policies shaped and
administered by other persons.
The Board has encountered trouble only when it attempted (as
in North Arkansas Electric and Bell Aerospace) to apply an addi-
tional "conflict of interest" requirement for "managerial" status,
requiring a finding of an irreconcilable conflict between the em-
ployee's duties and membership in a labor organization. The con-
flict of interest requirement has been mentioned on very few previ-
191. See supra notes 89-99 and accompanying text.
192. See North Arkansas Electric Cooperative, Inc., supra n.118.
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ous occasions, and has been employed by the courts as a standard
to be used only alternatively to or in conjunction with the Board's
primary standard. 193 In Bell Aerospace, the Supreme Court ad-
dressed, and rejected, the "conflict of interest" requirement. How-
ever, in Hendricks County, the Supreme Court rejected a challenge
to the Board's traditional "labor nexus" test for "confidential" sta-
tus, and not merely to the unrelated conflict of interest
requirement.
The rationale and policy implications behind the disparate his-
torical and legal evolution of the "confidential" and "managerial"
exclusions from the Act's coverage, regrettably, received compara-
tively little attention from either the majority or the minority
opinions in both Bell Aerospace and Hendricks County.
There are two fundamental and closely related differences be-
tween the "confidential" and "managerial" exclusions. The first
concerns the raison d'etre of each category itself. The "confiden-
tial" employee is excluded from collective bargaining because he or
she assists persons who perform "managerial" functions in the la-
bor relations area, and thereby gains knowledge of matters con-
cerning his or her employer's labor relations policies that may not
be appropriate to share with the collective bargaining representa-
tive. This is the one and only determinant of "confidential" status.
Contrary to the opinion of Justice Powell (as expressed in both hisBell Aerospace majority opinion"1 and his Hendricks County dis-
sent 9 5), "confidential" employees are not properly considered to
be "agents" of "management," nor is their exclusion from collec-
tive bargaining premised upon any particular "duty of loyalty"
that they may owe to their employers. The exclusion is based upon
these employees' access to confidential information which, if freely
divulged to the labor organization representing their fellow em-
ployees, would provide them with an unfair and unwarranted ad-
vantage over their employers. Since the type of confidential infor-
mation at issue is solely labor relations related, the imposition of a
"labor nexus" standard is appropriate.
Stated alternatively, the "confidential" exclusion exists in order:
(a) to forestall potential upsets in the balance of power between
unions and management that might otherwise occur were unions to
have free access to management's confidential labor relations data;
193. See supra notes 176-79 & 183 and accompanying text.
194. 416 U.S. at 268-95.
195. 454 U.S. at 192-200.
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and (b) to permit employers to trust that employees having access
to such information would not feel pressure to disclose its contents
to the union.196
The "managerial" exclusion is based upon the status and the de-
gree of authority of the "managerial" employee within the em-
ployer's executive structure rather than upon any set of specific
functional responsibilities performed by the employee or upon his
or her access to particular information. The "managerial" concept
is more nebulous and more subjective than the "confidential" con-
cept since its application to particular cases depends upon the de-
gree to which the affected employee's job responsibilities as a
whole identify him or her as a member or agent of "management"
as opposed to "rank and file.' 1 97 While it is wholly inappropriate to
speak of "confidential" employees as being "aligned with manage-
ment" or as "owing a duty of undivided loyalty" to management, it
is perfectly appropriate for such standards to be applied to pur-
portedly "managerial" employees. Indeed, "managerial" status has
been virtually defined by these admittedly subjective guidelines.
Furthermore, since "managerial" authority may be exercised
within an organization in many areas other than labor relations, a
"labor nexus" standard for determining that authority would be
196. The refusal of the Board and the courts to broaden the "confidential" category to
include employees with access to confidential business information in non-labor relations
areas indicates the specificity of the purpose of this category, as well as the fact that "confi-
dential" status was not meant to embrace all employees who might be in a position to mis-
use confidential information to their employer's detriment.
197. The "supervisory" employee's position is quite akin to that of the "managerial"
employee in this respect. Although the statutory definition of "supervisor" contained in sec-
tion 2(11) of the Act, and the case law on "supervisory" status may utilize certain indicia as
evidence of supervisory status, it is clear that that status depends ultimately upon an overall
assessment of the degree of authority the purported "supervisor" exercises with respect to
day-to-day work activities and the employment status of his or her fellow employees. Super-
visors are just as surely "agents of management" as are "managerial" employees whose au-
thority is exercised in areas other than the front-line administration of personnel policy.
Stated otherwise, supervisors have been excluded by statute from collective bargaining
based upon what Congress viewed in its deliberations over the Taft-Hartley Act as an irrec-
oncilable conflict between the role of a supervisor in the areas of evaluation and discipline of
employees and the obligations owed by fellow union members toward one another. See, e.g.,
H. REP. No. 245 on H.R. 3020, 80th Cong., 1st Sess., supra n.71, at 7, 13-15; S. REP. No. 105
on S. 1126, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 4-5; Remarks of Rep. Hartley, 93 CONG. REc. at 3533,
Extension of Remarks of Sen. Wiley, 93 CONG. REc. at 1099; Remarks of Sen. Ball, 92 CONG.
REc. at 5146. However, the strong degree of opposition from the congressional minority to
the blanket exclusion of supervisors from labor organizations representing their subordi-
nates reflected a recognition that even supervisors may have interests divergent from those
of management when their own wages, hours and conditions of employment are involved.
See, e.g., House Minority Rep. No. 245 on H.R. 3020, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 71-72; Remarks
of Rep. Javits, 93 CONG. REc. at 6450; Remarks of Sen. Pepper, 93 CONG. REc. at 4490.
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inappropriate and overly limiting.
The second, and even more apparent, difference between the
"confidential" and "managerial" groups derives from the nature of
the employees generally included. "Confidential" employees are in-
variably members of the rank-and-file, exercising virtually no influ-
ence over management policy and possessing virtually no control
over their wages, hours, and conditions of employment. The vast
majority of "confidential" employees are found in secretarial and
clerical positions, or in jobs such as timekeeper, payroll clerk or
personnel assistant. 198 These employees cannot be said to have any
"community of interest with management" and their exclusion
from collective bargaining thus cannot be said to be based upon an
"alignment with management" and, in fact, has been accomplished
in spite of the lack of any such "alignment." "Managerial" employ-
ees, however, occupy positions such as buyers, division managers,
and project engineers. This category would also include corporate
officers who, although drawing salaries and benefits from their em-
ployers, cannot be truly considered as "employees" in the practical
sense of the term. "Managerial" status has been, quite deliberately,
premised upon the degree of power which such persons can exer-
cise within their respective organizations, which, in many cases, ex-
tends to the power to influence their own wages, hours and condi-
tions of employment. Thus, "managerial" status is, by definition,
dependent upon the degree to which a particular employee is "al-
igned with management." Indeed, it indicates that that employee
is part of management itself.
The distinction between the definitions of the "confidential" em-
ployee, who is most certainly a "subordinate," and the "manage-
rial" employee, who is just as certainly a "superior," reflects the
following axiom: The availability of the protections and rights af-
forded by the Act as respects any particular employee ought, inso-
far as possible, to depend directly upon the power of that employee
to influence his or her employer's policies in general, and his or her
own status, perquisites, pay, and working conditions in particular.
Thus, the seemingly arcane delineations of these two categories of
employees excluded from the Act raise issues central to the Act's
very purpose. An understanding of the connection to that purpose
is crucial to a grasp of the subject.
198. See supra notes 42 and 78 and cases cited therein.
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IV. THE PUBLIC POLICY OBJECTIVES OF THE "CONFIDENTIAL" AND
"MANAGERIAL" EXCLUSIONS
There are two methods by which statutory rights may be effec-
tively weakened or vitiated, by legislative amendment or by judi-
cial or administrative construction. The first is to limit the means
by which those rights may be exercised and enforced or to place
the invocation of those means beyond the ability of the average
citizen. The other is to limit the class of persons to which those
rights may be made available. The force of a system of laws may
be blunted or even immobilized by the creation of large classes of
persons barred from the protection afforded by the statutes, par-
ticularly when the excluded classes may be exposed to the very
abuses that those laws were designed to alleviate.
The NLRB's very raison d'etre has been to provide workers with
a peaceful and lawful means to redress the imbalance of economic
power that would otherwise exist were workers required to deal
with employers on an individual basis. The framers of the Act spe-
cifically intended that its coverage be measured by this aim.19'
Furthermore, they presumptively extended the Act to all workers
not specifically excluded by statute who were in need of the pro-
tections afforded by self-organization and collective bargaining in
order to achieve a more equitable balance of economic power be-
tween employer and employee.
Although section 1 of the Act speaks of removing impediments
to production or safeguarding commerce from "injury, impairment
or interruption,"""0 the Act's ultimate goal was to relieve the causes
of labor-management strife by addressing its primary root cause:
worker inability to exercise sufficient influence over often intolera-
ble wages, hours and conditions of employment through peaceable
dealings with employers on an individual basis. Congress man-
dated that workers be afforded the right to organize and bargain
collectively in order to provide sufficient checks upon what had
hitherto been a stacked labor-market "deck" in favor of employers.
Professor Wellington described this reasoning and its implications
as follows:
Equality does not exist between the employer and the individual worker.
The employer it is argued has the power to unilaterally set the wages, hours
and terms and conditions of employment. When workers organize and bar-
199. Labor Management Relations Act, ch. 372, § 1, 49 Stat. 449 (1935) (current ver-
sion at 29 U.S.C. § 151 (1976 & Supp. V 1981).
200. Id.
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gain collectively, they have the power that comes from numbers. It is a
power which offsets or countervails that of the employer, often itself a col-
lectivity of individual investors in the corporate form. '
Professor Wellington further noted the non-economic conse-
quences of the imbalance of bargaining power in that market:
[T]he plainly economic terms of the employment contract represent only
one important criterion in judging its fairness. The conditions under which
a man works also must figure importantly; and before unions, these condi-
tions sometimes were physically frightful and administratively arbitrary.
The foreman often was possessed of management power. There was little in
the way of grievance procedure; there were few rules governing layoffs or
promotions; administration was in the foremen's discretion. And since the
foreman could discharge at will and hire by whim, he, as might be expected,
frequently used his power for personal gain or private revenge. The stories
are endless.
20 2
These employer abuses were the clear, though unstated, target of
the Act, and their alleviation remains the cornerstone of federal
labor policy today. Regardless of its reputation in some circles as
an "anti-union" law, the passage of the Taft-Hartley Act did not
change this fact. The thrust of the Taft-Hartley Act was to add the
alleviation of certain abusive practices by labor unions to the then-
established goals of federal labor policy, and to impose responsibil-
ities upon unions comparable to those imposed by the Wagner Act
upon employers, not to undermine the institution of collective
bargaining.0 3
201. H. WELLINGTON, LABOR AND THE LAW 27-28 (1968).
202. Id. at 32.
203. 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-187 (1976 & Supp. V 1981). This is best exemplified by the fact
that the Taft-Hartley Act did not amend the already-existing provisions of section 1 of the
Wagner Act (29 U.S.C. § 151 (1976)), but instead added the following paragraph to that
section:
Experience has further demonstrated that certain practices by some labor organiza-
tions, their officers, and members have the intent or the necessary effect of burdening
or obstructing commerce by preventing the free flow of goods in such commerce
through strikes and other forms of industrial unrest or through concerted activities
which impair the interest of the public in the free flow of such commerce. The elimi-
nation of such practices is a necessary condition to the assurance of the rights herein
guaranteed.
Id.
Section 1 of the Labor Management Relations Act itself indicated nothing that could be
viewed as a reversal by Congress of the recognition of the factors that had prompted it to
protect the right to organize and collectively bargain:
Industrial strife which interferes with the normal flow of commerce and with the
full production of articles and commodities for commerce, can be avoided or substan-
tially minimized if employers, employees, and labor organizations each recognize
under law one another's legitimate rights in their relations with each other, and,
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Charles 0. Gregory and Harold Katz have articulated a second
motivation for the passage of the Act: the protection of labor un-
ions as entities and their organizational activities from interference
and coercion on the part of employers. 0 4 At the time of the Act's
passage, industrial warfare between unions seeking to establish
themselves and employers seeking to prevent just that had been
escalating-particularly in the industrial union sectors where the
emergent Congress of Industrial Organization (CIO) was soon to
battle both employers and its established rival in the labor move-
ment, the American Federation of Labor (AFL). Gregory and Katz
see the Act as an attempt to end, or at least restrain, that warfare
by removing employers from the fight entirely.
0 5
By limiting the ability of employers to interfere with employee
free choice in the decision of whether and, if so, whom to select as
their bargaining representative, Congress sought to achieve the
dual aims of protecting the long-term integrity of the unions,
whose role was central to the collective bargaining process and of
achieving the hitherto elusive goal of labor peace in what was then
above all recognize under law that neither party has any right in its relations with
any other to engage in acts or practices which jeopardize the public health, safety, or
interest.
It is the purpose and policy of this chapter, in order to promote the full flow of
commerce, to prescribe the legitimate rights of both employees and employers in
their relations affecting commerce, to provide orderly and peaceful procedures for
preventing the interference by either with the legitimate rights of the other to protect
the rights of the public in connection with labor disputes affecting commerce.
29 U.S.C. § 151(b) (1976 & Supp. V 1981).
Clearly, the intent of the Taft-Hartley Act was to impose certain responsibilities and re-
straints upon both sides of the bargaining table and did not call into question the need for
or the legitimacy of those rights which Congress had recognized a dozen years earlier.
204. C. GREGORY & H. KATZ, LABOR AND THE LAW 224-29 (3d ed. 1979).
205. Id. at 224. This is best illustrated by their discussion of the difference between
the purpose of that Act and the Norris-LaGuardia Act:
Taken at its face value, the National Labor Relations Act was fundamentally dif-
ferent from the Norris-LaGuardia Act because it pledged the government to aid em-
ployees in securing independent organization, free from employer interference. The
anti-injunction statute, on the other hand, had simply removed the judicial restric-
tions on the freedom of organized labor to impose unionism on employers by means
of coercive economic self-help. Until the NLRA became law, the federal government
regarded union organizational campaigns as economic struggles between unions and
employers, with practically no holds barred, except for violations of the Sherman Act.
In the NLRA, however, Congress virtually ordered employers to stop resisting the
spread of unionism, telling them that the desire of their employees to organize was
none of their business and to keep their hands off. This, quite obviously, was an ep-
och-making step in itself, especially since the NLRA placed no restrictions on the
freedom of unions to exercise economic pressures on these same employees, whenever
they saw fit to do so.
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a very weak economy.
The employer activities prohibited by the Act as unfair labor
practices reflect both of these ends. Its prohibition of employer in-
terference with the right to organize and collectively bargain," 6
employer discrimination against workers seeking to join (or to
avoid joining) labor unions,201 and employer retaliation against
workers seeking relief or otherwise participating in the Act's en-
forcement process208 reflect the specific intent to safeguard em-
ployees availing themselves of the Act's protections from exposure
to employment-threatening repercussions. Its prohibitions against
employer domination of and interference with the internal affairs
or finances of labor unions 20 9 and against employer refusals to bar-
gain with labor unions2 ° were designed to protect the integrity of
unions as entities from attacks through employer tampering or
from undermining through employer refusals to deal. Finally, the
Act created an independent agency to interpret and enforce the
labor laws and the administrative and judicial processes to enforce
them.21 Congressional intent from the start has been to ensure
that the Act would foster an effective countervailing force to the
power of employers in the labor market.
2 12
The aim of the Act is to permit all employees, insofar as is possi-
ble, to take the opportunity to utilize its provisions in furtherance
of their labor relations interests. Although particular employees
may choose not to follow that course (either by inaction or by af-
firmative vote), the Act is designed to provide them with the free-
dom to make that choice without interference from or coercion by
their employers or by unions seeking to represent them. It is for
this reason that Congress and the Supreme Court have decreed
206. 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(1) (1976).
207. 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(3) (1976).
208. 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(4) (1976).
209. 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(2) (1976).
210. 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(5) (1976).
211. 29 U.S.C. §§ 153-187 (1976 & Supp V. 1981).
212. The addition of union unfair labor practices to the Act by the Taft-Hartley
amendments did not indicate any congressional retreat from its aim. Indeed, prohibitions on
labor union activities such as insistence upon the "closed shop," 29 U.S.C. § 158 (b)(4)
(1976), inducement of employer discrimination of workers, 29 U.S.C. § 158 (b)(2) (1976),
refusal to bargain with employers, 29 U.S.C. § 158 (b)(3) (1976), exaction of excessive or
discriminatory union dues in "union shop" arrangements, 29 U.S.C. § 158 (b)(5) (1976), and
engagement in certain forms of recognitional picketing, 29 U.S.C. § 158 (b)(7) (1976), were
intended to further that aim; i.e., to safeguard employee free choice with respect to activity
protected by the Act from union interference, just as the National Labor Relations Act was
intended to do so with respect to employer interference.
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that a liberal construction be given to the Act generally and to the
scope of its coverage in particular.213 The reasoning behind this ap-
proach is simple. The Act's remedial purpose is to correct certain
imbalances of power and resulting abuses in labor-management re-
lations that would likely exist in its absence and to provide effec-
tive means for doing so through unionization, collective bargaining
and the Act's own enforcement procedures. Virtually all employees
may potentially be in need of the Act's protection in at least cer-
tain respects because virtually all employees possess at least some
individual or collective interests at variance with those of their em-
ployers insofar as their wages, hours and conditions of employment
are concerned. With relatively few exceptions, this will hold true
regardless of the title or particular job responsibilities of any spe-
cific employee, precisely because its root causes lie in the status of
the employee per se and not in the nature of the particular
employment.
There is no single issue of greater potential significance in fed-
eral labor law than the definition of "employee" coverage under
the Act, for all of the protections and remedies offered by the Act
are of absolutely no value to an employee who cannot satisfy that
definition. The consistent message on this issue, from the Board
and the majority of courts that have considered this issue, is that a
strong presumption in favor of coverage exists and will control ab-
sent proof of clearly overriding factors indicating that preclusion of
coverage in a particular instance will serve the goals of national
labor-management relations policy.
Section 2(3) of the Act begins with the phrase that "the term
'employee' shall include any employee" and then enumerates cer-
tain, specific exceptions.21 The only instance of congressional re-
consideration of the scope of the definition of "employee" resulted
in the rejection of a strong effort to expand the scope of those ex-
ceptions substantially (except for supervisors) in favor of permit-
ting the Board and the courts to determine guidelines. 1 5 Those
guidelines demonstrate that employee coverage under the Act is
based primarily upon an employee's potential need for that cover-
age to protect his or her labor relations interests, unless a specific
and convincing reason overrides that need.
The imposition of a "management-alignment" or "employee loy-
213. See supra text accompanying notes 17-29.
214. 29 U.S.C. § 152(3) (1976).
215. See supra text accompanying notes 53-78.
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alty" test as apparently urged by several members of the Supreme
Court would substantially undercut the Act's effectiveness and
would be inimical to its policy aims. Furthermore, such a standard
would contradict the Act's very intent. Congress specifically in-
tended to eliminate the notion that an employee (or group of em-
ployees) somehow evidenced "disloyalty" to their employers by en-
gaging in unionization, collective bargaining or other "protected
concerted activities." It did so by drawing a strict separation be-
tween employee activity in that sphere and the underlying rela-
tionship between employer and employee, and by forbidding em-
ployers from demanding or improperly inducing employees to
evidence their "loyalty" or their "alignment" by refraining from
"protected concerted activity." Furthermore, the Act does not pur-
port to alter in any manner the obligation of every employee to act
in his or her employer's best interest with respect to matters be-
yond the Act's scope, such as job performance, maintenance of
confidentiality as to trade secrets and the like. In this sense, every
employee owes a duty of loyalty to management and can be said to
be "aligned with management." However, these obligations are in
no way connected with the right of any employee to engage in law-
ful activity in pursuit of his or her labor relations interests. The
"confidential" and "managerial" exceptions to the Act's coverage
have not been, and should not be, based upon such standards.
Justice Powell's assertion in Hendricks County that "the 'labor
nexus,' . . . is antithetical to any common sense view or under-
standing of the role of confidential secretaries"21 reflects a misun-
derstanding of the underlying purpose of the Act. While confiden-
tial secretaries might perform certain job tasks not required of
non-confidential secretaries, the labor relations interests of the two
groups are in most cases virtually identical. Confidential secretar-
ies are most certainly "employees"and just as prone to dissatisfac-
tion over their wages, hours and conditions of employment or un-
just discipline as are other secretaries. They are often just as
powerless to correct the sources of that dissatisfaction on an indi-
vidual basis as other secretaries would be. Allowing such secretar-
ies to engage in "protected concerted activity" under the Act
would in no way compromise or divide their "loyalty" to manage-
ment precisely because management does not and should not have
the right to demand that "loyalty" from them any more than they
have the right to demand it from any other employee. The basis of
216. 454 U.S. at 197.
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the "labor nexus" based "confidential" exclusion is entirely unre-
lated to "loyalty" or to "management alignment." It is premised
upon the unfair advantage that labor unions would obtain in col-
lective bargaining or contract administration were they to have ac-
cess to management's confidential labor-relations information or
strategy through members who have access to such information,
particularly when management would not have reciprocal access to
the union's confidential data or strategy. It is in this sense that the
"confidential" exclusion attempts to avoid potential "fifth-col-
umns" in labor relations.
The same reasoning applies to the refusal of the Board and most
reviewing courts to extend the "confidential" category to employ-
ees having access to their employers' confidential business informa-
tion unrelated to labor relations and personnel matters. Access to
such information in and of itself does not change those employees'
potential need for the protections and remedies afforded by the
federal labor laws. Their invocation of those protections and reme-
dies would not affect their "alignment with management" or their
duty of "loyalty" towards management by reason of their access to
such information and corresponding obligation to prevent its divul-
gence. Since this information would not, except in a very indirect
sense, deal with material relevant to matters of interest to the
union in its representative capacity,2'1 7 the employee's access to it
cannot be said to relate to his or her labor relations activities or
interests. Of course, such an employee might be in a position to
injure his or her employer's interests by disclosing confidential
business information to competitors, the media or other unautho-
rized third-party sources; however, he or she would be in a position
to so do regardless of union membership or activity. The proper
sanction in that case would be the discipline or discharge of the
wrong-doing employee and not the exclusion of that employee
from the Act's coverage on a spurious "confidential" or "manage-
ment alignment" theory.
Certain of these considerations also apply to allegedly "manage-
rial" employees. As already noted, this category covers employees
who either formulate, determine and implement management pol-
217. The union involved most likely would be entitled to such information on request
in any case, if it pertained to its responsibilities as bargaining representative in the areas of
collective bargaining and contract administration (Detroit Edison Co. v. NLRB, 440 U.S.
301 (1979); NLRB v. Acme Indus. Co., 385 U.S. 432 (1967)), or if it raised a claim in collec-
tive bargaining of financial "inability to pay," NLRB v. Truitt Mfg. Co., 351 U.S. 149
(1956).
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icy, or can make financial commitments on its behalf, i.e., those
employees who exercise organization power and who possess a
large measure of discretion in the performance of their duties.218
While the cases on "managerial" status may occasionally speak of
a "closer alignment of interest with management than with fellow
employees," the "managerial" employee is better described as a
part of management itself and, thus, not really an "employee" at
all in the practical sense of the term, or, in the sense in which this
term was used in section 2(3) of the Act.2 19 The management em-
ployee's position within the employer's organization and the degree
of responsibility that necessarily carries can be said to remove any
sense of identification with the employee ranks and, correspond-
ingly, calls into serious doubt the need of such employees to utilize
the provisions of the Act as the vehicle for asserting whatever indi-
vidual labor relations related interests they may possess at vari-
ance with those of their employer. The importance of the "mana-
gerial" employee to the organization which he or she serves also
enhances the employee's individual bargaining power vis-a-vis the
employer on matters affecting wages, hours and working condi-
tions. It also provides to such employees at least some degree of
relief from the imbalance of power in the general labor market.
Finally, and most pertinent to the purposes and policy aims of the
Act, "managerial" employees comprise precisely that group from
which true "employees" need the protection that unionization and
collective bargaining would provide.
Strict limits have been, and should be, placed on the scope of
the "managerial" exclusion in order to avoid undue removal of
large numbers of true "employees" from the Act's coverage. This is
the true significance of the specific statutory inclusion of "profes-
sional employees," many of whom from time to time exercise func-
tions which are arguably "managerial," within the Act.2 0 By so do-
218. See supra text accompanying notes 115-190.
219. 29 U.S.C. § 152(3) (1976). The "managerial" employee might conceivably be
viewed as a person "acting as an agent of an employer" under section 2(2) of the Act, (29
U.S.C. § 152(2) (1976)), although this contention has not been dealt with by any reported
decisional law.
220. Section 2(12) of the Act defines "professional employee" as:
(a) any employee engaged in work (i) predominantly intellectual and varied in
character as opposed to routine mental, manual, mechanical, or physical work; (ii)
involving the consistent exercise of discretion and judgment in its performance; (iii)
of such a character that the output produced or the result accomplished cannot be
standardized in relation to a given period of time; (iv) requiring knowledge of an
advanced type in a field of science or learning customarily acquired by a prolonged
course of specialized intellectual instruction and study in an institution of higher
1983
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ing, Congress clearly intended to remove the intellectual quality of
the employee's work, the educational prerequisites for the work,
the means by which work output is measured, the degree of judg-
ment and discretion exercised by the employee in the performance
of his work (except with respect to the management of the em-
ployer's enterprise itself) as factors by which an employee's eligi-
bility for coverage under the Act would be determined. This is only
proper since these factors have little to do with whether the "pro-
fessional" employee possesses, as an employee, labor relations in-
terests potentially at variance with those of his or her employer
and the power to resolve those variances on an individual basis.
The possible untoward consequences of an overly broad "confi-
dential" or "managerial" exclusion are quite obvious.2 1 These in-
clude attempts by employers to spread arguable "confidential" or
"managerial" work as thinly as possible in order to exclude the
maximum possible number of employees from bargaining units;
the manipulation of these exclusionary categories to fit particular
employees, who for personal reasons only may not wish to join bar-
gaining units to which they clearly belong, or, more frequently, to
pay otherwise legitimately required dues or fees to labor unions
pursuant to "union shop" or "agency shop" agreements; and the
potential use of promotions to relatively low-level management
slots as a "carrot" (or the threat of the denial of promotional op-
portunities as a "stick") to induce upwardly mobile employees to
avoid unionization. The outcome would be the inappropriate and
undesirable deprivation with respect to large numbers of employ-
ees of a choice to which they should be entitled by law-the right
to choose whether or not to engage in "protected concerted activ-
ity" under section 7 of the Act. A substantial gutting of the effec-
learning or a hospital, as distinguished from a general academic education or from an
apprenticeship or from training in the performance of routine mental, manual, or
physical processes; or
(b) any employee who (i) has completed the courses of specialized intellectual in-
struction and study described in clause (iv) of paragraph (a), and (ii) is performing
related work under the supervision of a professional person to qualify himself to be-
come a professional employee as defined in paragraph (a).
29 U.S.C. § 152(12) (1976).
Section 9(b) of the Act, first proviso, which mandates separate organization of "profes-
sional" employees unless a majority of the "professional" contingent votes for inclusion in a
bargaining unit containing "non-professional" employees is a far more appropriate recogni-
tion of those factors unique to "professional" status than would be their partial or total
exclusion from the Act's definition of "employee." 29 U.S.C. § 159(b) (1976).
221. The Board's best discussion of these issues appears in its decision in Kleinberg,
Kaplan, Wolff, Cohen & Burrows, P.C., 253 N.L.R.B. 447 (1980).
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tiveness of that Act and of the effectiveness of labor unions as the
chosen representatives of employees choosing to exercise their
rights under that Act would necessarily result.
Hendricks County quashed, at least for the present, and albeit
in a rather offhanded way, the danger of an overly broad "confi-
dential" exclusion. The analogous danger has not yet been ad-
dressed sufficiently by the courts with respect to "managerial" em-
ployees. Although Bell Aerospace's rejection of the "labor nexus"
standard in this context was proper in view of the purpose of the
"managerial" exclusion, the risk of extending the application of
this exclusion to other inappropriate situations continues. In fact,
due to likely changes in the structure of the workforce and in the
design and content of many jobs, these controversies are likely to
increase,222 particularly in two areas.
The first involves professional employees who occupy advisory
roles with respect to organizational policy or who play a minor part
in decision making, particularly in institutional settings utilizing
"collegial" or other patterns of decision making not in accordance
with traditional hierarchical models generally prevailing in indus-
try. These employees may, indeed, play an important part in for-
mulating certain aspects of policy and in implementing personnel
222. For an excellent recent commentary on the need for redefinition of the "manage-
rial" exclusion in view of changes in the work force and the introduction of new concepts of
organizational decision making in American industry in a "nonpyramidal" direction (includ-
ing employee participation therein), see Note, Collective Authority and Technical Exper-
tise: Reexamining the Managerial Employee Exclusion, 56 N.Y.U. L. REV. 694 (1981). The
author argues for the adoption of a revised standard for the "managerial" exclusion as ap-
plied to ostensibly "non-managerial" professional or highly skilled "technical" employees
who exercise certain "managerial" functions (and contribute to the making of "managerial"
decisions) by reason of the tapping of their expertise by management.
The Note proposes that after determining that an employee does exercise some manage-
rial authority, the Board should further inquire:
(1) Are the employee's primary duties nonmanagerial? If so,
(2) Does the employee exercise managerial functions as part of a group without hav-
ing substantial determinative authority individually? Or,
(3) Does the authority stem from an employee's nonmanagerial activities?
Id. at 731 (footnotes omitted).
The Note correctly points out that as the structure of more and more enterprises becomes
less "pyramidal" (i.e., flatter at the top) and as the distribution of decision-making author-
ity within these enterprises is broadened, collective governance may become a more wide-
spread phenomenon, even in so-called "traditional" manufacturing settings. Employees op-
erating under such a system may possess a share of "managerial" authority, albeit quite
diluted by the participation of others similarly situated. The Board's determinations in the
future may therefore become less concerned with the issue of on what side of the "manage-
rial" fence a particular employee will fall and more concerned with the placement of that
"fence" at a particular point on the continuum of policy-making influence with the affected
enterprise.
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decisions through the mechanism of "peer review," particularly in
education, nursing or similar services where the confluence be-
tween policy and standards of professional practice is greatest. Yet,
even these institutions generally retain a hierarchical administra-
tive structure with the power to effectively set pay scales and per-
sonnel policies, often with little or no input on the part of the in-
stitution's professional staff. Thus, despite the influence of that
staff in many areas of decision-making, it is doubtful that is mem-
bers can be considered as occupying a non-employee status with
respect to labor relations matters affecting them. Although the Su-
preme Court addressed this issue with respect to certain university
faculty in Yeshiva University,228 it is evident that we have not
heard the last of this issue, and the matter of collective bargaining
rights of employees at the intersection of "professional" and "man-
agerial" roles will certainly receive future judicial and legislative
scrutiny.221
The second area involves unionized employees whose collective
bargaining representatives may play a role in management through
such vehicles as representation on boards of directors, joint labor-
management "productivity" committees and so-called "quality cir-
cles" comprising members of both labor and management. Al-
though still in their embryonic stages, these trends may have tre-
mendous potential impact on the future of collective bargaining by
blurring certain of the factors dividing the two sides of the bar-
gaining table. 225 Furthermore, the impact of these trends are being
and will be felt throughout the American industry, not merely in a
relatively limited set of professional-service institutions such as
universities and hospitals. An overly broad approach to the appli-
cation of the "confidential" and "managerial" exclusions, based
upon such an unwarranted "loyalty" or "managerial alignment"
standard such as that suggested by Justice Powell in his Hendricks
County dissent is the wrong approach to take. A narrower ap-
proach, with a firm presumption in favor of "employee" coverage
absent convincing reasons why coverage should not be afforded in
223. See supra notes 187-90 and accompanying text.
224. See Note, Managerial Employee: A Label in Search of A Meaningful Definition,
48 U. CIN. L. REv. 435 (1979), for a good discussion with respect to the application of the
managerial exclusion to professional and middle management employees.
225. See, e.g., Blackburn, Worker Participation on Corporate Directorates: Is
America Ready for Industrial Democracy?, 18 HOUSTON L. REv. 349 (1981); Note, Employee
Representative on the Corporate Board of Directors: Implications Under Labor, Antitrust
and Corporate Law, 27 WAYs L. Rav. 367 (1980).
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particular cases, is essential to prevent the effectiveness of the Act
from being nibbled away by those exclusions.
V. CONCLUSION
The fundamental premise of the Taft-Hartley Act is that em-
ployees be permitted to elect whether or not to engage in organiza-
tion, collective bargaining, and other "protected concerted activi-
ties." The effectiveness of the Act heavily depends upon the
breadth of persons covered by it. An unwarranted restriction of
that coverage will seriously undermine the Act's vitality and hinder
the attainment of its policy objectives. The NLRB and the great
majority of the courts have ruled that a liberal interpretation of
the Act's definition of "employees" be followed, and that employ-
ees are covered absent convincing considerations compelling a con-
trary result. This is as it should be, for if an employee is for any
reason not covered by the Act, he or she is by definition barred
from the exercise of those rights and remedies afforded by its
provisions.
The three most widely applicable exceptions to the Act's cover-
age pertain to supervisors, and "confidential" and "managerial"
employees. Supervisors are excluded from the Act by express lan-
guage,22 with the rationale for that exception based upon the role
of supervisors as management's front-line enforcement arm in the
area of management's personnel policy, the inevitable and direct
conflict between that role and membership in the union represent-
ing the employees supervised, and severe doubts as to whether un-
ions representing supervisors can truly retain their independence
from those representing rank-and-file employees. 227
"Confidential" employees have been excluded by Board policy
because their duties in the area of labor relations would, were they
union members, inevitably place them in a position where they
might be required to divulge confidential management data and
strategy to the union. This would lead to a significant upset in the
balance of power in collective bargaining, which the Board and the
courts have viewed as an adverse effect outweighing the considera-
tions in favor of affording union membership and bargaining rights
to these employees. 2 8
"Managerial" employees have been excluded by Board policy be-
226. 29 U.S.C. § 152(3) (1976).
227. See supra notes 57-76, 197 and accompanying text.
228. See supra text accompanying notes 194-96.
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cause of the power they wield and exercise on behalf of their em-
ployers as well as their ability to function without close supervision
and independence from strict adherence to policy guidelines set
forth and administered by others. Their exclusion is based upon
the fact that they are part of management itself, i.e., the very
group that the Act seeks to protect "employees" from, and upon
their relatively greater bargaining power as individuals vis-a-vis
employers with regard to matters concerning their own wages,
hours and conditions of employment.22 '
The notion that "management alignment" or the "undivided loy-
alty" which an employee owes to management should act as a fac-
tor in and of itself in determining an employee's rights under the
Act is foreign to the language and spirit of the Act and should be
decisively rejected. An employer does not have the right to demand
or expect "loyalty" from its employees with respect to "protected
concerted activity" as defined by the Act, regardless of the "loy-
alty" that the employees may owe to the employer in other areas of
their relationship. Indeed, the Act's very existence and literal
terms refute the notion that an employee's availment of its protec-
tions and remedies constitutes a "disloyal" act or that organized
employees need be feared as potential "fifth columnists." Further-
more, the Act covers all "employees" unless specifically excepted
by statute or well-established Board policy. It does not create an
excluded class of employees "allied" with management (indeed, a
congressional attempt to do so in 1947 was rejected), and such a
class should not be create by the courts. If an employee is part of
the decision-making apparatus of management and therefore
clearly without semblance of a "community of interest" with em-
ployees, the "loyalty" or "alignment" will be implied as an integral
part of that status and he or she will be excluded from the Act as
"managerial" or, if appropriate, as "supervisory."
"Confidential" employees are merely assistants to persons per-
forming "managerial" roles in the labor relations area. They are by
definition not part of management and must be considered part of
the "employee" force. It is not the proper function of the courts to
determine who employees should be "aligned" with at the bargain-
ing table for purposes of determining whether or not they can par-
ticipate in the bargaining process. Any attempt by the courts to do
so would usurp the provisions of the Act that clearly leave that
decision up to the employees themselves.
229. See supra text accompanying notes 197-198.
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Confidential and Managerial Employees
The Supreme Court in Bell Aerospace and Hendricks County
did not contradict the Board's long-established policy of limiting
exceptions to the Act's coverage to those situations presenting ob-
jective considerations dictating that the presumption of coverage
be overridden. Their decisions do not support introduction of ex-
ceptions based upon subjective factors such as "loyalty" or "align-
ment." Although the Court did not sufficiently elaborate upon its
reason for applying a "labor nexus" test to "confidential" employ-
ees but not to "managerial" employees, the rationale is evident.
"Confidential" status is based upon an employee's access to an em-
ployer's information and strategy disclosure of which to a union
would unduly harm the employer's collective bargaining position.
Thus, "confidential" status exists in those instances where the in-
formation and strategy to which the employee has access will affect
personnel and labor relations matters which would inevitably be of
direct interest to the union. It is for this very specific reason that
the "confidential" exclusion has not been extended to employees
having access to business information which, although confidential,
is of marginal or no relevance to collective bargaining between the
employer and the union.
"Managerial" status, on the other hand, is not necessarily re-
lated to the "managerial" employee's labor relations functions
since the authority and discretion exercised by "managerial" em-
ployees need not be confined to areas with a "labor nexus." That
standard makes no sense with respect to "managerial" status. The
basis for the exclusion of "managerial" employees from the Act's
coverage has no relation to the particular function which defines
the area within which an employee works because it derives from
the status and power exercised by that employee within the em-
ployer's organizational hierarchy, the lack of a "community of in-
terest" with true "employees" and the consequent dilution or elim-
ination of that employee's need for the Act's protection.
New forms of labor-management cooperation, the likelihood of
increased participation by labor unions in certain "managerial" de-
cisions of employers and changes in the structure and composition
of the labor force will necessitate a reexamination of issues related
to the extent of the coverage of the Act. This article has argued
against a view of the Act as a means of choosing the roster of op-
posing teams in combat and in favor of a broad construction of its
coverage based upon the underlying need which the Act was meant
to fulfill-the need for employees to have an influential voice in
determining their wages, hours and conditions of employment. As
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long as that need continues, and as long as the chosen instrument
with which to meet it continues to be unionization and collective
bargaining, that broad coverage must continue.
